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OVERCRIMINALIZATION AND
WASHINGTON'S REVISED CRIMINAL CODE
Arval A. Morris*
A revised criminal code has been prepared for Washington.'
Opinions of it will vary depending, at least in part, on one's general
view of the criminal law. The last time Washington's substantive crim-
inal law was extensively revised was sixty-three years ago, in 1909. It
may well be sixty-three more years before the next revision. That
would make it due in 2035 A.D. Given such lapses of time everyone
should take the long view and judge accordingly, eschewing pettiness,
provinciality and emotional rhetoric when passing on Washington's
Proposed Criminal Code. Criticisms, when warranted, should be con-
structive. The Proposed Code should be received warmly for it is a
significant work indeed, and is a salutary step, although not a giant
stride, in the right direction. It deserves a fair assessment in light of
what our state is today and what it is likely to become in the next sixty
years.
Whatever one may believe about the current condition of the crim-
inal law, no one can justifially doubt its importance to society. The
criminal law is the ultimate legal foundation on which citizens place
their reliance for protection from the gravest harms. Citizens depend
on it to set forth and enforce the minimum standards of responsibility
that a man owes to his fellows. In doing so, the criminal law uses
drastic sanctions and regulates the severest forces that citizens permit
to be used against individuals except during warfare. But fear of pun-
ishment is not the only reason why people obey the criminal law. Ev-
eryone has experienced situations where the criminal law easily could
have been violated with impunity because the violation would have
gone undetected but, nevertheless, the criminal law was not violated.
Such instances illustrate citizen acceptance of the criminal law as the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., Colorado College, 1951; M.A.
1952, J.D., 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., Yale University, 1958; LL.D. (h.c.),
Colorado College, 1972.
I. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REVISED
WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE (Tent. Draft 1972) [hereinafter cited as R.W.C.C.]. Al-
though I refer to the Code as proposed, technically the Code has only been submitted to
the people by the Judiciary Committee for the purpose of obtaining their comments.
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minimal standard of proper social behavior. The great bulk of our cit-
izens take pride in living under a rule of law and acting in accordance
with its and society's notions of what is right. So long as the criminal
law genuinely serves humane ends and respects the citizens whom it
purports to govern, it will function as a civilizing force, as well as a
powerful instrument of social control.
Criminal sanctions insure that the criminal law will be feared. But
to be fully respected, the criminal law itself must respect the rightful
demands of individuality and freedom. The criminal law must be min-
imal, not maximal, and it must not embody the unique moral or reli-
gious views of any one group in our pluralistic society.2 The substan-
tive criminal law should always allow "those who hold the faith [to]
... follow its precepts without requiring those who do not hold it to
act as if they did." 3 In its deepest sense, the criminal law reflects a
duality: it can be a powerful instrument for human safety, and for civ-
ilizing mankind, but also it can be a powerful instrument for human
destruction and debasement. If criminal law omits a necessary stand-
ard, then vital human concerns are left exposed and endangered. On
the other hand, if criminal law fails to promote humane ends, or if it
is obsolete, unwarrantedly broad, drastic or draconian then it becomes
a vehicle for perpetuating gross injustices. 4 Any law carrying such
grave accountability should be as just, as humane and as rational as
men can make it. In essence, this means that the criminal law should
be restricted to its proper goals; yet within these goals, it should be
thoroughly effective by protecting all human beings in their persons
and property and by preventing the exploitation or corruption of
youth or others in need of special care.
Although a sound criminal law is basic to a good social order, it has
not always attracted the same careful attention that scholars and law-
yers have given to other areas of law that touch and concern eco-
2. See, e.g., Williams, Authoritarian Morals and the Criminal Law, 1966 CRIM. L.
REV. 132; P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); and Dworkin, Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966).
3. Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 COLM. L.
REV. 701, 740 (1937).
4. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS (1967); CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Pound & Frank-
furter ed. 1922); NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931); and
Harno, Some Significant Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure in the Last
Century, 42 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 427, 442 (1951).
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nomic matters. The Uniform Commercial Code provides one of many
possible examples. Unlike other fields of law, Anglo-American crim-
inal law has seldom been subjected to a consistent and comprehensive
treatment that orders its doctrines and rationalizes them with under-
lying social policies.5 Only recently have some of the best minds of the
legal profession, displaying concerns and abilities equal to the impor-
tance of the subject, involved themselves with the criminal law. With
this new -activity have come many insights, including the recognition
that all too often the existing criminal law is inconsistent in its inner
workings or fails to attain the societal ends that it is meant to serve.
Additionally, scholars in fields other than law are focusing on the
criminal law and its processes, and their work is yielding tangible re-
sults.6 Recent attention to the problems of the criminal law has
brought an interest in criminal law revision. Obsolete statutes, incon-
sistent doctrines and overlapping rules fail to serve humane ends and
are repugnant to our sense of equality and fairness.7 The first fruits of
change have been mainly in the areas of procedure 8 and criminal law
administration.9 But with the completion of the American Law Insti-
tute's Model Penal Code, 10 under the guidance of Professor Herbert
Wechsler of Columbia University, the pace of revising the substantie
criminal law has quickened. Today, a large number of states11 as well
5. The works of Glanville Williams and Jerome Hall are the exceptions. See, e.g.,
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (1961); J. HALL, STUDIES ON JUR-
ISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY (1958); and J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW (1947).
6. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
7. See, e.g., Kartozian, Dead Law-Dead Letter? An Analysis of the Problem of
Obsolete Laws in the Penal Codes of the United States, 2 PORTIA L.J. 75 (1966); Com-
ment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103 (1961).
8. Spurred by court decisions invigorating the Bill of Rights and by the ALI
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), many states
and the federal government have revised their rules governing criminal procedure. See,
e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P.
9. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1966-67); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, STAFF REPORTS (1967); D. GOURLEY, EFFECTIVE POLICE
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1967); and W. BROWN, THE POLICE AND CORRUPTION
(1967).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited as M.P.C.].
I1. As of April, 1971, eleven states had revised their codes: Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and
Wisconsin. Thirty-two states were planning substantive revisions, fourteen of which had
been completed but had not yet been enacted into law. Only seven states had no overall
revisions planned: Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before a Sub-
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as the federal government12 are engaged in substantive penal law revi-
sion, and most of the revision has taken the Model Penal Code for its
guide. The Judiciary Committee of the Washington legislature has
acknowledged that it relied extensively on the Model Penal Code and
on the codes of other states that recently have revised their penal law,
stating that "having these other codes to rely on has made the drafting
of [the Proposed Washington] Code... an immeasurably easier
task."13
The Proposed Code is comprehensive, and when one adds the crim-
inal provisions in other chapters of the Revised Code of Washington
that will not be affected by the Proposed Code, it becomes obvious
that Washington's criminal law does not suffer from the defect of
failing to embrace and protect vital human concerns. 14 These vital
concerns are not denuded of the protection of the criminal law. To the
contrary, the comprehensiveness of the Code raises opposite sorts of
questions. Thus, the chief purpose of this article is to render a service
of constructive criticism. It will focus on several areas of the Proposed
Code that are either inappropriate for the criminal sanction or too
comprehensive and in need of adjustment or omission.
I. THE CRISIS OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION 15
The proper aims of the criminal law, as indicated above, are first,
to protect all human beings in their persons and property; second, to
comm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong.. 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 558-59
(testimony of H. Wechsler) (1971).
12. McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern
Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663.
13. R.W.C.C., Foreword at ii.
14. The Proposed Code covers such items as classes of crimeq. affirmative defenses.
burdens of proof, general principles of criminal liability and responsibility, anticipatory
offenses such as criminal attempts. murder, manslaughter, assault, reckless endanger-
ment of person or property, coercion, kidnapping, custodial interference, unlawful im-
prisonment, rape in three degrees, sexual contact in three degrees, arson, reckless burn-
ing, criminal mischief in three degrees, burglary, criminal trespass, theft, robbery, extor-
tion, receiving stolen property, criminal fraud, forgery, impersonation, bigamy, incest.
bribery, corrupt influence, perjury, intimidation, tampering with a witness or physical
evidence, resisting arrest, hindering prosecution, escape, bail jumping, abuse of office.
disorderly conduct, riot, public intoxication, loitering, public indecency, prostitution.
communication with a minor for immoral purposes and many, many more.
15. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967). See also
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 303-312 (1968); F. ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JU STICE 3-4 (1964).
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prevent the exploitation or corruption of youth and others who are in
special need of care and protection; and third, to accomplish these
goals by fully respecting the demands of individual freedom and by
assuring that the criminal law is minimal, not maximal. 16 The crim-
inal law must be confined to these goals by the legislature. One of the
modem tasks of the legislature is to strip the criminal law of its ex-
crescences so that the criminal justice system can be free to concen-
trate on the essentials. If the legislature does not, vital human inter-
ests, although fully covered by a criminal statute, may be left exposed
and endangered by a lack of law enforcement officers because their
time is spent in other activities. Such use of the criminal law to serve
-,improper ends imposes a heavy and unnecessary cost on society and
the criminal justice system.
Few decisions are more important than those determining what
behavior should be made criminal. The use of the criminal law to en-
force debatable and not widely shared morals, to provide social wel-
fare services, to collect revenue by levying traffic offenses, and to
avoid legal restraints on law enforcement through the use of substan-
tive, criminal law provisions (e.g., vagrancy) to solve procedural prob-
lems (e.g., interrogation), to name but a few of the many current mis-
16. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE'HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL
2-4 (1969); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401
(1958); Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE LJ. 987 (1940); Nelson,
Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical
Perspective, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 450 (1967).
17. The dimensions of the problem in Washington are discussed by C. SCHMID & S.
SCHMID, CRIME IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1972):
It is common practice to dichotomize the seven index crimes into 'violent
crimes' or 'crimes against the person' and 'crimes against property.' 'Violent
crimes' include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and
aggravated assault. 'Crimes against property' include burglary, larceny over $50
and automobile theft. The overwhelming proportion of offenses reported to the po-
lice are property crimes.
For example, in the city of Seattle in 1970, 89.8 percent of the major crimes
were property crimes and the remaining 10.2 percent, violent crimes.
.. For Seattle, the proportion of violent crimes fluctuated from a minimum of
5.8 percent in 1944 to a maximum of 13.1 percent in 1968.
*.. For the state of Washington, during the thirteen-year period 1958-1970 for
which data are available, the proportion of violent crimes varied from a minimum
of 5.2 percent in 1959 to a maximum of 9.0 percent in 1968. For the three re-
maining series which pertain to various parts of the United States as a whole, the
proportion of violent crimes ranged from 12.9 percent in 1963 to 20.7 percent in
1942; cities from 100,000 to 250,000 population, 10.3 percent in 1961 to 13.9 per-
cent in 1947; and cities with populations of 250,000 or more, 12.8 percent in 1941
to 19.1 percent in 1954.
Id. at 3-5.
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uses, tends to overburden the criminal justice system, to make it
inefficient, to reduce citizen respect for law and to gravely impair its
proper use against serious criminal conduct such as murder, assault,
theft, rape, etc.17 We have no accurate measure of the total amount of
crime that occurs; however, the indicators that we have show an in-
crease in the total amount of serious crimes.1 8 Over the years, easy
assumptions, too frequently indulged in by legislatures, have burdened
the criminal law. Legislatures have assumed that the only effective
way to control behavior is to subject it to the criminal law and that if
an important group of citizens, or the legislature, morally believes that
"something" should be done about a subject, then that "something" is
the proper work of the criminal law.' 9 The result is overcriminaliz-
ation.20
The criminal law is most successful when its reach is restricted to its
proper aims.2' Criminal law sanctions are not the only methods avail-
18. The increase in the number of violent crimes in Washington is demonstrated by
the following figures:
Cities with populations of 250,000 or over rank highest in violent crimes with a
rate of 859.8 Iper 100,000 persons] in 1969 and 980.4 in 1970. In recent years, the
curves for both Seattle and Tacoma have moved above the curves for cities of
100,000-250,000 population and for the entire United States. During the past three
years the rates per 100,000 population for violent crimes [murder. nonnegligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault] in Seattle are 598.4
in 1968, 729.5 in 1969, and 596.8 in 1970, and for Tacoma, 415.8 in 1968. 484.8 in
1969, and 398.1 in 1970. To indicate further the steep rise in violent crimes during
the past decade, the increase between 1940 and 1960 in Seattle was 39.4 percent
compared to 37 1.0 percent between 1960 and 1970.
[F] or property crimes-burglary, larceny and automobile theft-... [e] x-
cept for a short period in the 1960's, Seattle ranks in first place [among Spokane,
Tacoma, and the averages for cities over 250,000 population and for the United
States]. In Seattle, the rate for all property crimes combined was 1,156.3 per
100,000 of population in 1940, 1,142.6 in 1950, 1,656.6 in 1960 and 5,283.3 in
1970. Between 1940 and 1970 combined property crimes in Seattle increased by
356.9 percent, between 1940 and 1960, 43.3 percent and between 1960 and 1970.
218.9 percent. The patterns for the remaining series ... are very similar to that for
Seattle
Id. at 17-19.
19. See Walker, Morality and the Criminal Law, 11 HOWARD Soc'Y J. 215
(1961); J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 357 (1933).
20. Professor Allen states: "[T] he system of criminal justice may be viewed as
a weary Atlas upon whose shoulders we have heaped a crushing burden of responsi-
bilities relating to public policy in its various aspects." F. ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (1964).
21. The criminal sanction works best when:
(I) The conduct is prominent in most people's view of socially threatening be-
havior, and is not condoned by any significant segment of society.
(2) Subjecting it to the criminal sanction is not inconsistent with the goals of
punishment.
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able for motivating persons to comply with legal rules. There is a
broad spectrum of other available sanctions including civil liability,
licensing, administrative regulations and other non-criminal penalties.
Regrettably, Washington's Proposed Criminal Code does not reflect a
full appreciation of these alternatives. It continues to enforce highly
debatable moral views and to make the criminal justice system serve
as a welfare agency by encoding many of the so-called "status
crimes." 22
II. PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS
The Proposed Code continues the status crime of public intoxica-
tion, but slightly narrows the range of its application by adding that
the person must be so intoxicated in public that "he endangers himself
or other persons or property, or annoys persons in his vicinity."23 The
continuation of this crime is a mistake and a good example of over-
criminalization. This crime not only uselessly burdens the administration
of the criminal law, but it deceives citizens into believing that a social
problem has been solved when it has not. The problem of alcoholism
should be recognized for what it is-a social-welfare problem to
which the appropriate response is social-welfare services. Alcoholism
is not an appropriate problem for the penal-correctional processes of
the criminal law. Alcoholics are neither cured nor deterred by jail or
by the usual correction procedures. Indeed, by defining public drunk-
(3) Suppressing it will not inhibit socially desirable conduct.
(4) It may be dealt with through even-handed and nondiscriminatory enforce-
ment.
(5) Controlling it through the criminal process will not expose that process to
severe qualitative or quantitative strains.
(6) There are no reasonable alternatives to the criminal sanction for dealing with
it.
These criteria can be used in making up a kind of priority list of conduct for
which the legislature might consider invoking the criminal sanction.
PACKER. suipra note 15, at 296.
22. See Murtagh, Status Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36 FORD. L. REv. 51
(1967), for a description of laws that criminalize certain types of persons within the so-
ciety rather than certain types of voluntary behavior.
23. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.050. This qualification also tends to preclude a constitutional
attack on the statute as criminalizing persons solely because they suffer an illness (alco-
holism). For example, would it be constitutional to make criminal everyone who is in-
fected with tuberculosis? See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Driver v.
Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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enness as a crime, alcohol deviancy can be aggravated and rein-
forced. 24
The national evidence on the crime of public drunkenness has been
collected.25 Over two million arrests each year-more than one out of
every three arrests made in this country-are for the crime of public
drunkenness. This number represents more arrests than for any other
crime, and approaches almost forty percent of the total non-traffic
arrests in this nation. One-half of all misdemeanor convictions are for
the crime of public drunkenness. Additionally, we don't know how
many people are picked up for public drunkenness but charged with
some other crime. But, we do know that in 1968 six hundred thou-
sand arrests were made for disorderly conduct (second only to drunk-
enness) and that ninety-nine thousand arrests were made for va-
grancy. The arrests made for drunkenness alone tally more than twice
the number of arrests made for the combined total of the seven serious
crimes which the FBI calls its "Index Crimes" (Willful homicide, for-
24. Chronic drunkenness offenders are generally excessive drinkers who
may or may not be alcoholics, but whose drinking has involved them in difficulties
with the police, the courts, and penal institutions. They are a group for whom the
penal sanctions of society have failed and to whom existing community resources
have not been applied.
... The constantly incarcerated individual finds it nearly impossible to maintain
a meaningful marital and familial relationship; his ability to find employment is
seriously jeopardized by his arrest record coupled with his poor education. By con-
stantly being officially labeled by the police, the courts and correctional institutions
as a public drunk, he begins to see himself as a public drunk; the jail becomes little
more than a shelter to regain his physical strength. Because the public intoxication
offender is usually unable to support himself, he frequently turns to petty
thievery....
Social policy has its greatest negative effect on excessive drinkers who are not
alcoholics. An excessive drinker who confines his drinking to weekend bouts (a pat-
tern not uncommon in the middle classes), but who does not drink secretively. may
find himself frequently arrested and perhaps incarcerated. If this happens often
enough, he may be conditioned by the enforcement, the judicial, and the correc-
tional processes in such a way as to contribute to his drinking problem. Where be-
fore he confined his drinking to weekends and managed to hold a job and be a
breadwinner, he now finds these roles increasingly difficult and harder to maintain.
and crises arrive which encourage his drinking. Instead of arresting his excessive
drinking, the social policies have modified ... his deviant behavior and contributed
to the development of a more serious deviancy-alcoholism. Thus, the public in-
toxication offender confronts the society with a serious social problem which in-
volves the total community as well as the criminal justice system."
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT, DRUNKENNESS 7-11 (1967).
25. The statistics in the next two paragraphs, unless otherwise noted, are from N.
MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 16, at 6-10. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, DRUNKENNESS
1 (1967).
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cible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, theft of $50 or over
and motor vehicle theft). These arrests are not evenly distributed
across the social spectrum. In most states the middle and upper-class
persons who are drunk in public are either ignored or simply taken
home by the police. Most arrests involve skidroad derelict persons,
primarily men. The cycle for many is from drunk tank to skidroad
and back to drunk tank. 26
The estimated national average cost of each drunkenness case-
arrest, court, jail time-is $50. Conservatively estimated, we spend
about $100 million per year because we choose to use the criminal
law to handle drunk offenders. This figure does not include a penny
spent for rehabilitative treatment or subsequent prevention of drunk-
enness, which are the realistic approaches to this problem. Further-
more, the great number of drunkenness arrests overload police capaci-
ties and jails, as well as clog the courts. In drunkenness cases, citizens
and courts are demeaned. Instead of trying each case individually on
its unique merits, as required by due process of law, the courts move
toward mass production models, allowing only a very few minutes for
each case or trying persons collectively, thereby violating due process
guarantees and reducing citizen respect for law. A good example of
overcriminalization interfering with proper police activity comes from
a study of public drunkenness in Washington', D.C., during a nine-
month period. A special tactical police force unit officially cre-
ated "to combat serious crime" made forty-four percent of its arrests
for drunkenness. In another city ninety-five percent of the short-term
prisoners were drunkenness offenders.
The Washington evidence is analogous to the national evidence
except that American Indians are overrepresented, perhaps because of
their regional circumstances of poverty and hopeless future. The sta-
tistics collected from the records of the city of Seattle provide an ex-
ample.27 Seattle arrests for public drunkenness average about 3,500
26. D. PITTMAN & C. GORDON, REVOLVING DOOR: A STUDY OF THE CHRONIC POLICE
CASE INEBRIATE (1958).
27. See C. SCHMID & S. SCHMID, CRIME IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1972). In
that study the authors determined that:
In terms of prevalence, cost and social impact, problem drinking is one of the
most serious and complex of all contemporary problems.... First, in many areas
there are more arrests for offenses involving intoxication than for all other offenses
combined. For example, in 1970 in the city of Seattle 53.2 percent of all arrests
were for drunkenness and driving under the influence. In Spokane and Tacoma the
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each year, and about one-third of the persons arrested account for
two-thirds of the arrests.28 In 1971, there were 3,694 arrests.
Eighty-nine percent were males and eleven percent females. Sixty-five
percent were white; twvelve percent black; nineteen percent American
Indian; two percent Mexican American; and two percent fell in all
other categories. Thirty percent were aged fifty or more; twenty-seven
percent were between forty and forty-nine years of age; twenty-two
percent were between thirty and thirty-nine; and twenty-one percent
were between ages eighteen and twenty-nine. White males accounted
for 3,304 arrests (white females for 231) or almost sixty-five percent
of all arrests. Washington's Supreme Court provides a sketch of "a
fairly typical case history of an alcoholic" who has been uselessly sub-
jected to the "treatment" and "correction" processes of the criminal
law because of his status as an alcoholic: 29
In asserting the hopelessness of his predicament, and the inevitability
of its consequences, defendant showed that he had been convicted of
drunkenness 98 times; that his total sentences ran to 17-1/2 years al-
though he had served only a fraction of this, being repeatedly let out
of jail on suspended sentences. He refers to himself as a 'chronic
corresponding percentages were 63.8 and 39.5, respectively. For the entire United
States in 1970 there was a total of 8,117,700 arrests of which 2,381,200 or 29.3 per-
cent, were for drunkenness and driving under the influence.... In addition to the
2,381,200 arrests for drunkenness and driving under the influence in the United
States in 1970, there were 1, 132,400 arrests for three other alcohol-related offenses
-violation of liquor laws, vagrancy and disorderly conduct. These five categories
represent 3,5 13,600 arrests, or 43.3 percent of all arrests in 1970.
Id. at 272.
During the three-year period, 1968-70, there were 28,899 persons 18 years of age
and over arrested one or more times in the city of Seattle; 24,992, or 86.5 percent,
were males and 3,907, or 13.5 percent were females.
... Each person is counted only once regardless of the number of arrests....
Certain similarities obtain for both male and female arrestees. Drunkenness is
by far the most frequent charge for both sexes with 9,505, or 38.0 percent, of the
male arrestees, and 1,058, or 27.1 percent, of the female arrestees. Based on fre-
quency of arrest, seven offenses are included among the top ten for both sexes:
drunkenness, driving under the influence, larceny, nonaggravated assault, suspi-
cion, violation of narcotic drug laws and disorderly conduct. These seven offenses
account for over 75.0 percent of all the male arrestees, and over 70.0 percent of the
female arrestees.... The seven index crimes--murder and nonnegligent man-
slaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny ($50 and
over) and automobile theft accounted for only 13.3 percent of the male arrestees
and 18.3 percent of the female arrestees.
Id. at 194-96.
28. The following information in this paragraph has been taken from an unpub-
lished study by Professor L. V. Rieke, Alcoholism and Its Correction in Seattle (1972).
on file in Professor Rieke's office at the Law School, University of Washington.
29. Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786, 789, 435 P.2d 692, 695-96 (1967).
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drunk' and dates his serious drinking problems from 1946 when his
wife divorced him. At age 62, in addition to his 98 convictions for
public drunkenness, he has been twice convicted of escaping while a
jail trusty. The accumulated unserved time from these convictions
amounts to about five years, but there appears to be no proceedings
pending or threatened to make him serve any part of this.
Public drunkenness constitutionally can be made a crime.3 0 But the
cost is heavy, and the criminal law has not been effective. Jail sen-
tences have not rehabilitated the chronic offenders nor prevented in-
toxication in public. Agreeing with other reports, the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
recommends that "drunkenness should not itself be a criminal of-
fense.... ." However, the commission qualifies its recommendation by
adding that the "implementation of this recommendation requires the
development of adequate civil detoxification procedures. 3 1 This qual-
ified recommendation is acceptable if funds are forthcoming for de-
toxification centers.
Washington appears to have taken a salutary step in 1972 when the
legislature enacted the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treat-
ment Act.3 2 The Act provides, inter alia, for detoxification centers, for
voluntary and involuntary civil commitment, and that "no... [state]
political subdivision may adopt or enforce a local law.., that in-
cludes drinking, being a common drunkard or being found in an in-
toxicated condition as one of the elements of the offense giving rise to
a criminal or civil penalty or sanction." This beneficial and progres-
sive 1972 statute is in conflict with the Proposed Code's criminaliza-
tion of public drunkenness. If the Proposed Code's provision were
enacted it would impair and repeal parts of the 1972 statute. Clearly,
the wise course is to eliminate the crime of public drunkenness from
the Proposed Criminal Code.
The crime of public drunkenness should be eliminated regardless of
the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act. The simple
30. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). See also Hutt & Merrill, Criminal Re-
sponsibility and the Right to Treatment for Intoxication and Alcoholism, 57 GEO. L. J.
835 (1969); and Kaplan, Powell v. Texas, 5 ('RIM. L. BULL. 191 (1969). Cf. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
31. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 236 (1967).
32. Ch. 122 [1972] WASH. LAWS, 1st Ex. Sess.
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expedient of discontinuing enforcement of public drunkenness provi-
sions is seldom discussed in the literature,33 but should be considered
seriously. Doing nothing is always an option. Rather clearly, arrests
should not be made in circumstances where the costs to society, to the
criminal system and to the arrestees are not justified by the benefits
received. In such cases it is better that the criminal system do nothing.
The crime of public intoxication provides a case in point. The criminal
law should not be used, although a different legal scheme might be
justified. Thus, the recommendation is that something may be done,
but that the criminal law should do nothing.
Opposition to this recommendation is two-fold: (1) alcoholics will
lose services, and (2) a community concerned with neat, tidy and
clean streets will not tolerate skidroad derelicts and others being
drunk in public. The first argument is irrelevant. The criminal law
processes do not provide the needed welfare services to alcoholics
which the argument presupposes. The second argument is really quite
different. It is public officials who probably fear for themselves politi-
cally if they do not clean up the streets. But they fear without knowing
the full community sentiment on the issue, and their fear is probably
exaggerated. 34 The annoyance or nuisance aspect of public drunken-
ness, as set forth in the Proposed Code, is easily overstated, especially
when the drunk is part of the skidroad culture. If the drunk is a
genuine nuisance, or a danger to himself or others or to property, any
legislature can provide for short periods of civil commitment instead
of criminal penalties. Periods no longer than necessary to restore so-
briety should be used, such as the ones provided by the Uniform Alco-
holism and Intoxication Treatment Act.
In summary, there is no solid case for using the criminal law to deal
with public drunkenness, but there is a solid case for eliminating the
crime from the criminal law and from Washington's Proposed Crim-
inal Code.
III. VAGRANCY-LOITERING-DISORDERLY CONDUCT
According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports there were 710,000
33. But see T. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY ARRESTS (1971); and PACKER,
supra note 15, at 346.
34. NIMMER, supra note 33, at 10.
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arrests for disorderly conduct in the United States in 1970.3 5 More
arrests are made for disorderly conduct than for any other crime ex-
cept public drunkenness. 36 Vagrancy, defined similarly to disorderly
conduct, accounted for 113,400 arrests.37 Together, the crimes of
vagrancy and disorderly conduct were responsible for 823,400 arrests,
almost twice the number of the next closest classification-the
415,600 narcotic drug law violations (including marijuana posses-
sion). These totals represent an enormous commitment of tax dollars
and police manpower which are not available for dealing with the
more serious matters of the criminal law.
Disorderly conduct and vagrancy statutes frequently are drafted so
loosely and so broadly that they vest a wide discretion in the police
and allow law enforcement officers rather than the legislature to de-
cide what conduct should be treated as criminal. Such statutes are
open to abuse, and they are abused.38 They are conducive to ineffi-
ciency and police harassment. 39 Many authorities see them as prime
factors in poor police-community relationships40 and they bring the
law into cynical disrespect. The criminal law should be carefully
drafted, and the legislature should not use a blunderbuss approach.
Precisely drafted statutes limited to prohibiting specific, serious mis-
conduct enable the police to concentrate their resources on those es-
sential situations. Criminal statutes should not delegate legislative
power to police officers, permitting them to decide who and what
conduct should be criminalized. 41 Disorderly conduct and vagrancy
35. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPoRT--1970, at 119
(1971).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. We should be given pause by the collected evidence of past police abuses. See
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, 338-41, 354-60,
371-72 (1965); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
603, 646 n. 162 (1956); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953); and Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds--Old Concepts
in Need of Revision, 48 CAL. L. REV. 557 (1960).
39. Police administrators frankly admit that they respond to public pressures. This
may risk unequal enforcement of the law on different parts of the population as well as
loss of constitutional controls on police behavior. See Wilson, Police Authority in a
Free Society, 54J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 175, 176 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 26-27 (1968).
41. See Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. AD. REV.
140 (1963); Abernathy, Police Discretion and Equal Protection, S.C.L.Q. 472 (1962);
and LaFave, The Police and Non-Enforcenent of the Law (pts. I & 2), 1962 WIs. L.
REV. 104, 179.
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laws encompass a wide range of statutory formulations in this country
and include wide varieties of petty misbehavior so harmless it should
not be subjected to the controls of criminal sanctions. Although the
Proposed Code is much better than existing Washington laws on the
subject, nevertheless, the Proposed Criminal Code provides too many
examples of the blunderbuss approach.
The Proposed Code substitutes the word "loitering" for "vagrancy. '42
The crime of loitering can be completed if a person "intentionally
remains in or about a building or buildings or public premises adja-
cent thereto of any public or private school or institution of higher
learning, without having any lawful reason or relationship involving
custody of or responsibility for a pupil or any other license or privi-
lege to be there."'43
While better than existing Washington law, the disorderly conduct
provisions of the Proposed Code are broader, more vague and allow
the police even greater subjective decisions than the proposed loitering
provisions:44
Disorderly Conduct.
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he:
(a) intentionally makes excessive noise which unreasonably dis-
turbs another; 45 or
42. "The present Washington law in point is RCW 9.87.010, a vagrancy stat-
ute. . . . The new section makes several changes in the present law." R.W.C.C. §
9A.84.060, Comment at 346.
43. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060(e). Interestingly, this provision is unlike the rest of this
section in that it is utterly devoid of the concept of purpose which is required by all the
other provisions. Purpose is a device tending to limit statutory breadth and looseness.
Failure to disperse, R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.020, is a similarly defined crime.
44. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030.
45. The presence of inherent subjectivity and the lack of terms susceptible of objec-
tive measurement are patently obvious. The standard prohibiting "excessively" noisy
conduct that "unreasonably disturbs another" is probably unconstitutional because "ex-
cessively" noisy conduct that "unreasonably" disturbs some people is not "excessive"
nor "unreasonably" disturbing to others. Thus, a person is forced to guess at the
meaning of the terms-no standard of conduct susceptible of objective measurement is
set forth. Also, without specificity and objectivity this statue allows the standard for free
speech and assembly to be at the whim of a police officer. It invites discriminatory en-
forcement "against those whose association together is 'annoying' because their ideas, their
lifestyle or their physical appearance is resented by a majority of their fellow citizens."
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15(1971).
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(b) uses abusive language and thereby recklessly creates a risk
of assault; 46 or
(c) without lawful authority, intentionally disrupts any lawful
assembly or meeting of persons; or
(d) intentionally obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.47
(2) Disorderly conduct is a violation.48
Vagrancy-type laws are frequently used by police as justification for
arresting, searching, questioning and detaining suspicious persons who
are sought for reasons other than vagrancy.49 The result is that sub-
46. This provision, like the one immediately preceding, is of doubtful constitutional
validity. Language that is abusive to one person may not be abusive to another, although
a police officer may believe it to be such. But worse, what criteria shall the police officer
use to judge (1) that a risk of assault has been created by abusive language, and (2) that
the risk has been created recklessly? How would a Washington police officer respond to
facts similar to those in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), where a Georgia po-
lice officer seeking to restore access to a public building was taunted with: "White son of
a bitch, I'll kill you;" "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death;" and "You son of a
bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Id. at 519. The
person who uttered these words was arrested and convicted under Georgia's statute
providing that any "person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in
his presence... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of
the peace.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303 (1963). On
appeal the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that Georgia's statute
was unconstitutionally broad and vague and would tend to suppress constitutionally
protected rights, especially free speech. In such circumstaoces, "it matters not that the
words appellee used might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and
precisely drawn statute." Id. at 520. Washington's proposed provision appears to con-
tain defects of overbreadth and vagueness similar to Georgia's.
See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949), where the court said, "Accordingly a function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger." Id. at 4.
47. There are problems with this provision as well. One who intentionally walks his
dog on a leash, or intentionally congregates with others at a crowded street corner while
awaiting a ride or a meeting with another person would appear to fall within the reach
of this provision by his intentional obstruction of pedestrian traffic. Similar problems
inhere in the provision relating to vehicular traffic. Patrolmen directing traffic always
intentionally obstruct some vehicular traffic in the interests of promoting the overall
traffic pattern. The point is that this provision needs careful rethinking and redrafting so
it will apply only to behavior which should be prohibited.
48. In R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.040, the Proposed Code sets forth three categories of
crimes: felonies, gross misdemeanors and misdemeanors. It states that "a violation does
not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability
or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense." Although it is not
formally called a crime, but is rather an offense, a "violation" is subject to control by
the police and to prosecution in a criminal trial where the burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt. A violation can subject a "violator" to a forfeiture or fine, but not to
imprisonment. It seems to me that this is, in reality, a crime for which no sentence or
deprivation other than fine or forfeiture is provided and that the Proposed Code really
sets forth four categories of crimes. In any event, the thinking behind this category is
forward looking, salutary and commendable.
49. Arresting a person "on suspicion," like arresting a person "for investigation," is
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stantive criminal law provisions are unwisely used to solve procedural
or similar problems. The President's Commission on Crime reported
that "[vagrancy-type statutes] are also used by the police to clean the
streets of undesirables, to harass persons believed to be engaged in
crime and to investigate uncleared offenses. '50 If procedural problems
are present, then they should be faced and resolved as such. Substan-
tive criminal law provisions should not be used to solve procedural
law-enforcement problems.
If it is necessary to... legalize arrests for mere suspicion, then the
grave policy and constitutional problems posed by such suggestions
should be faced. If present restrictions on the laws of attempts or ar-
rest place too onerous a burden upon the police because of the nature
of modern crime, then such propositions should be discussed and re-
solved on their merits, as, for example, the proposals in the Uniform
Arrest Act.51
In addition to being susceptible to police abuse and lacking a justi-
fying policy basis, most existing disorderly conduct, loitering and va-
grancy-type statutes are of questionable constitutional validity. Pa-
pachristou v. Jacksonville5 2 consolidated five separate cases for deci-
sion and held a Jacksonville, Florida, vagrancy-type ordinance uncon-
stitutional.53 Part of the handwriting seems to be on the wall. All de-
fendants were convicted of vagrancy, but for various reasons: four
were "prowling by auto"; others were "loitering" or being a "common
alien to our constitutional system. Police are supposed to arrest only when "probable
cause" is present. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15-17 (1948). This ig a fourth
amendment standard directly applicable to the federal government, and through the
fourteenth amendment it is equally applicable to the states. Whiteley v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560(1971).
50. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. TASK FORCE REPORT, THE COURTS 103 (1967). "The underlying purpose [of va-
grancy-type laws] is to relieve the police of the necessity of proving that criminals have
committed or are planning to commit specific crimes." N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N,
REPORT 591 (1935).
51. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603.
649 (1956). See also LaFave, "Street Encounter" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968).
52. 405 U.S. 156(1972).
53. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965) provided at the time the
arrests were made that:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gam-
blers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards.
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property.
lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers
and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without
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thief'; others were "disorderly loitering on a street" and "disorderly
conduct-resisting arrest with violence," and others were "vagabonds."
The Supreme Court first noted that a legislative directive to the police
that they "arrest all 'suspicious' persons would not pass constitutional
muster" and that a "vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak
for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but undis-
closed grounds for the arrest. '54 Moreover, the Court was influenced
by "the effect of the unfettered discretion [the ordinance] places in
the hands of the Jacksonville police."55 The court held: 56
This ordinance is void-for-vagueness, both in the sense that it 'fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden by the statute,'.. . and because it encour-
ages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions....
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of
which is that 'All [persons] are entitied to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids.'
This case indicates that the chief vice in vagrancy-type laws is their
wholesale jettisoning of due process, the basic principle of legality and
the foundation stone on which legitimate law enforcement rests in a
free and democratic society. Departures from the principle of legality
have also been criticized by the President's Crime Commission: 57
The practical costs of this departure from principle are significant.
One of its consequences is to communicate to the people who tend to
any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neg-
lecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses
of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served,
persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or
minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal
Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
405 U.S. 156-57 n. I.
54. 405 U.S. 169.
55. Id. at 168. The court also stated, "Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and
generalized as that one in this ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more
than vindicating affronts to police authority:
*The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles
before the magistrate in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which
permits conviction for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House
of Corrections as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that ap-
pear to have no other immediate solution. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 63 1."
id. at 166-68 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 162.
57. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, THE COURTS 103-04 (1967).
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be the object of these laws the idea that law enforcement is not a regu-
larized, authoritative procedure, but largely a matter of arbitrary be-
havior by the authorities. The application of these laws often tends to
discriminate against the poor and subcultural groups in the popula-
tion. It is unjust to structure law enforcement in such a way that pov-
erty itself becomes a crime. And it is costly for society when the law
arouses the feelings associated with these laws in the ghetto, a sense of
persecution and helplessness before official power and hostility to po-
lice and other authority that may tend to generate the very conditions
of criminality society is seeking to extirpate.
Close control over the delegation of authority to employ the sanctions
of the criminal law exists only when the criminal law is clearly and
carefully defined. Then police, judicial and administrative responsi-
bility can be located.
The Papachristou case had not been decided when Washington's
Proposed Criminal Code was drafted. Several proposed sections are
defective because they are overbroad on their faces. They have not
been considered in light of these cases, nor in the full light of the proper
aims of the criminal law. As a result, the entire chapter on disorderly
conduct (R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.84) should not be enacted -into law. 58
The existing laws on the subject deserve to be repealed. The pro-
posed provisions should be rethought, greatly narrowed or completely
eliminated. All redrafted provisions should serve the proper aims of
the criminal law.
58. Much of the text in this section is equally applicable to other of the Proposed
Code's broad and diffuse provisions defining crimes in this chapter. For' example.
R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.020 (failure to disperse) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of failure to disperse if:
(a) he congregates with a group of four or more persons and there are acts of
conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any
person or substantial harm to property; and
(b) he intentionally refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace
officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law.
(2) Failure to disperse is a misdemeanor.
Consider the implications of Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), where an or-
dinance made it a criminal offense for "three or more persons to assemble.., on any of
the sidewalks ... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing
by .. " Id. at 611 n.I. The Supreme Court held that this ordinance was violative on its
face of the due process standard of vagueness and the constitutional right of free as-
sembly and association. Consider also Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971), where the
ordinance made it a criminal offense if any "person ... wanders about the streets or
other public ways or... is found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without
any visible or lawful business and ... does not give a satisfactory account of himself."
Id. The Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional because it "is so vague and
lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that ... [as applied] ... it failed to give 'A
Vol. 48: 5, 1972
Overcriminalization
IV. BIGAMY AND INCEST
One of the best books on criminal law to be published in the last
decade labels bigamy and incest as the "two imaginary crimes,"
adding that "it is extremely difficult to give. a coherent account of why
the conduct denounced by these offenses should be treated as crim-
inal."59 Washington's Proposed Criminal Code continues these two
crimes, 60 but the question remains: By what justification?
A. Bigamy
According to the Proposed Criminal Code, bigamy, a third degree
felony punishable by five years imprisonment or a fine up to $5,000,
or both,61 is committed whenever a person "intentionally marries or
purports to marry another person when either person has a living
spouse. '62 It is no defense if both parties are fully aware of the prior
marriage; thus, the purpose of this proposed revision seems to be to
protect the community and not an individual interest. A person is
given an affirmative defense if he "reasonably believed that the prior
spouse was dead" or if he "reasonably believed that he was legally eli-
gible to remarry. '63 The penalties provided by the proposed new sec-
tion go beyond the Model Penal Code's section which "grades bigamy
as what would be a gross misdemeanor in Washington, whereas this
section provides ... a third degree felony designation. '64 What is the
justification for such severity?6 5
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbid-
den ...' " Id. at 545.
However, notice should be taken of a recent Supreme Court case, Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972), involving a demonstration by Black students in front of
a high school. In that case the Court held that a city antinoise ordinance prohibiting per-
sons from willfully making a noise or disturbance which disrupts or tends to disturb the
peace or good order of a school session was not so overbroad as to be unconstitutional.
59. PACKER, supra note 15, at 312-13. 1 rely on several of Professor Packer's ideas
in this section.
60. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010 (bigamy) and R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020 (incest).
61. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(!)(c).
62. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010(l).
63. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010(2)(a) and (c). Also, he has a defense if he remarried
believing that a previous invalid court decree was valid. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010(2)(b).
64. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010, Comment at 274.
65. On its face, the proposed section seems partially to incorporate the principle of
strict liability. The intent required by the provision goes only to the act of marrying or
purporting to marry another person. Neither the element of intent, nor that of knowl-
edge, seem to extend to the language: "when either person has a living spouse." This
language merely describes an attendant circumstance which objectively must be present
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We are told only that the "basic reason for the higher grading is a
[moral?] judgment that one who intentionally violates the statute and
has no defense to the prosecution has substantially threatened the
marriage institution, a secular value worthy of protection by society,"
and that moreover, "the disruption of the innocent party's life is itself
a harm which should be prevented and deterred." 66 The latter justifi-
cation is dubious, and does not support the full breadth of the provi-
sion. Since the proposed new section applies even if both parties are
cognizant of the previous marriage, that portion of the second justifi-
cation invoking "the disruption of an innocent party's life" either can
be dismissed as cynicism, or if sincere, the drafter failed to achieve the
desired end and the provision should be narrowed.
The first justification amounts to no more than a private moral
judgment that rests ultimately upon the religious teachings of Christi-
anity which condemns all forms of marriage except monogamy. Mos-
lems, and other peoples, have practiced polygamy for hundreds of
years and seem to have a very stable marriage institution. This experi-
before the crime is completed. Thus, restricted to this analysis, the extent of the inten-
tional element is satisfied with proof of the requirement that the actor intended to marry
another, and does not include the additional requirement that he must intend to marry
another knowing that he or the other has a living spouse. Seemingly, the proposed provi-
sion would apply to a person who marries another even if that other person should have
a living spouse and should have successfully concealed that fact. If this were the end of
the analysis this would be guilt without intent, and with a vengeance! It would go sub-
stantially farther than the existing statute which is limited to a person who marries and
who, himself, has a living spouse. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.15.010 (1959).
The proposed bigamy provision can be saved from a strict liability construction by a
judicial decision and R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.08.050, 9A.08.020, and 9A.04.130(9) and (14).
R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050 sets forth the general proposition that "where a statute defining
an offense does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose absolute liability, it
should be construed as defining an offense requiring one of the mental states described
in section 9A.08.020(2)." Thus, a judicial decision is needed that the legislature did "not
clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose absolute liability" for bigamy. If this is
obtained then one is thrown back to R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050. But that section does not
state which of the various intent concepts is required. It refers only to R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.020(2), which sets forth three categories of intent (specific intent or purpose.
knowledge, or recklessness) and one of criminal negligence. Thus, another question
arises: which of the three categories of intent should attach to the language of the bigamy
proposal defining the required attendant circumstance. i.e., "when either person has a
living spouse"? R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(3) states that "when a statute defining an offense
prescribes as an element thereof a specified mental state, such mental state is deemed to
apply to every material element of the offense... " Since the definition of bigamy re-
quires specific intent or purpose, that category would carry throughout so long as the
attendant circumstance can qualify as a "material element." R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(9)
and (14) require that the specific intent attach to the attendant circumstance ("when ei-
ther person has a living spouse") because it is made a material element by these two
provisions.
66. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010. (omment at 274.
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ence leads one to question the wisdom of the committee's view that
polygamy "substantially threatens the marriage institution." It seems
unsupported by evidence. Perhaps polygamy and polyandry, like big-
ainy, represent the triumph of hope over reality, but no secular
reason has been advanced by the Judiciary Committee to justify serial
monogamy as the only form of legally recognized marriage.67 One is
left to conclude that the actual underlying reason is religious, but la-
belled secular.6 8 If only a religious injunction, or feeling, can be ad-
vanced as the justifying rationale for the crime of bigamy, then that
alone should supply sufficient reason for the legislature to remove the
crime from the statute books and preserve Washington's historic sepa-
ration of church and state.
Frequently, bigamy only involves an attempt by the parties going
through a ceremony to give some respect to a legally adulterous rela-
tionship. Prosecution in these cases serves no worthwhile purpose, and
increases the lot of human misery.6 9 The offense of bigamy is not a
serious part of the crime problem nor is it statistically important. It is
an example of the legal stigmatization and punishment that can occur
because a person offends a particular religious code that has been cast
into law. One wonders if there is secular justification for the crime.
The rationales usually advanced have been collected by Professor
Hart. 70 The crime of bigamy serves (1) to profect the public records
67. Technically analyzed, the proposed statute does not apply if a single person
seeks to marry several unmarried persons simultaneously, but it does apply if the "mar-
riages" are seriatim. Nor does the statute require that the persons involved be of op-
posite sexes; thus, presumably it would apply to bigamous "homosexual marriages."
68. Professor H. L. A. Hart has advanced a similar thesis. After analyzing and dis-
missing the reasons usually advanced to justify the crime of bigamy, he says that the real
consideration that lies behind the crime is a religious feeling of propriety that seeks to
be shielded by the criminal law from sham marriages which would degrade the marriage
ceremony. On this theory, for Hart, the bigamist is a nuisance who threatens religious
ceremonies and religious feelings of propriety. H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
38-45 (1963).
69. As Professor Packer has put it:
In addition to its utilitarian vacuity, the law is in practice enforced only sporadi-
cally, and then usually against members of minority groups or low-income people
who are either culturally insensitive to the legal formalities attendant on family
relationships or economically incapable of invoking them. There is substantial
reason to believe that most bigamists ended their prior marriage with an informal
'divorce by consent.' The typical pattern is that the deserted second wife complains
to a welfare agency about the absconder's nonsupport, and the ensuing investiga-
tion reveals that in addition to being a deserter he is a bigamist. The resulting mess
is hardly helped by invocation of the criminal sanction. The offense is one we could
do without.
PACKER, supra note 15, at 314.
70. H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 38-45 (1963).
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from confusion and to protect the celebrating officer from wasting his
time; (2) to prevent provocation and public affront to the first spouse,
and (3) to guard against bigamous marriages because they are more
likely to result in desertion, divorce and nonsupport. These reasons
are, to say the least, not convincing. They are trivial, and as pointed
out by Professor Hart, they should be dismissed. Protection of the
public records is already safeguarded by the Proposed Code which
punishes both the giving of false information in relation to official
processes71 and perjury.72 None of the trivial reasons advanced justify
the use of the criminal law.
Professor Packer has isolated another possible justifying rationale,
after carefully inspecting the fact patterns of the past bigamy prosecu-
tions. He writes that "almost without exception, they involve fraud on
the second spouse, which is discovered after her apparent husband
deserts her;" thus, "viewed in this light, the offense is essentially rape
by deceit, inducing a woman to enter into sexual cohabitation by mis-
representing marital status. ' 73 This, it seems to me, might present a
secular interest worthy of protection. However, it affords no justifica-
tion for the Code's proposal which applies even if there is full divul-
gence. Criminal protection, if it is afforded at all, should be provided
against deceit, and the crime should turn on whether or not disclosure
was present. On this analysis, it does not matter whether a person had
one or a hundred spouses at the time, or practiced monogamy, po-
lygamy or polyandry. The core of the crime should be that of de-
ceitful sexual imposition. All that is needed is an additional provision
to proposed section 9A.44.060 (rape in the third degree) which
provides that third degree rape is committed whenever "a person, know-
ing himself lawfully to have a living spouse and failing to inform the
other person of this fact, intentionally marries or purports to marry
that other person for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with
that other person." Bigamy is an expendable offense, and it should be
removed from the proposed code.
B. Incest
The crime of incest, an offense of ecclesiastical origin, presents
71. R.W.C.C. § 9A.72.030.
72. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.72.010, .020.
73. PACKER, supra note 15, at 314.
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problems similar to bigamy. Incest taboos of one sort or another ap-
pear prominently in literature and psychiatry. Statutory definitions
vary widely and often go well beyond the incest notions discussed in
literature and psychoanalytic research. On the other hand, incest pros-
ecutions are infrequent. Under the Proposed Code, the crime of in-
cest, like bigamy, is a third degree felony carrying a penalty of five
years imprisonment or $5,000 fine, or both, and it would occur when-
ever a person "engages in sexual intercourse with a person whom he
knows to be related to him, either legitimately or illegitimately, as an
ancestor, descendant [including stepchildren and adopted children
under eighteen], brother or sister of either the whole or half blood,
uncle, aunt, nephew or niece."'74
The Judiciary Committee states:' 5
The two social interests which are protected here are: 1) prevention or
deterrence of sexual relations between persons related to one another
by blood in such a Way that there is a significant probability of genetic
defect in any possible child which might be born as a result of their
sexual relations, and 2) prevention or deterrence of sexual relations
between persons whose close living relationship-step-parent, step-
child-make the younger person peculiarly susceptible to undue influ-
ence.
The genetic reason is clearly insufficient, as set forth below. If the
sole justifying reason for criminalizing incest is the protection of a
child's personality development, the inappropriateness of the proposed
statute is apparent on its face. It limits its protection of adopted per-
sons or stepchildren to those under eighteen, an age when personality
maturation has crystalized. But, contrary to this limitation, it "pro-
tects" all others throughout their lifetimes. If protection of a child's
personality growth is the sole reason for the statute (absent the genetic
consideration) the inconsistency shows that the proposed provision
seeks to enforce a private morality. Where both parties are fully adult,
e.g., a sister and brother over thirty or an uncle forty and a niece
74. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020(l) and (2).
75. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020, Comment at 277-78. Additional commentary to this
section states that the reason for limiting incest with adopted or stepchildren to those
children under eighteen years of age is because "there can be no genetic defect argument
made to support treating as incest sexual intercourse between a step-parent and his step-
child; thus .... the law must rest on the notion that the risk of undue influence.., over a
stepchild who lives in the home of his step-parent requires special provision. The age
specified ... reflects this judgment." Id. at 277.
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thirty (or vice-versa), and they privately commit incest with knowledge
and complete consent, what other purpose is being served? Absent the
genetic consideration, the question remains: why should the criminal
law prohibit incest between consenting adults in private?
The criminal law can, and should, safeguard the interest of a child's
proper psychological development. Granting this interest as legitimate
does not justify including incest as a separate crime in the Proposed
Code. In fact, the incest taboo and its reinforcement by defining it as
a crime might be part of the problem and not part of the solution.
Where a child is involved, and the seducer is a parent, surrogate
parent or a close but substantially older family relative, the experience
of sexual relations can, but need not necessarily, be psychologically
traumatic.76 The psychological effect depends, in part, on whether the
added element of the guilt supplied by the incest taboo is strong, weak
or absent. The presence of a strong incest taboo may provide the
foundation for guilt that harms the psyche. There is good reason to
believe that when a society defines incest as a crime and thereby con-
demns it further, the added psychological guilt, first by the incest
taboo and secondly by its reinforcement in the criminal law, makes
more grievous the psychic wound created by incestuous sexual inter-
course. This is particularly true in case of criminal prosecution. The
judicial process requires that the child be interrogated repeatedly
about the facts by police officers, social workers out of court and
prosecutors in court. The result is to reinforce strongly the incestuous
experience, repeatedly reinforcing the debilitating shame or guilt. In
such circumstances the judicial process serves to harm the very in-
terest that the criminal law seeks to protect: the growing psyche of a
young child. Incest taboo damage can also be observed in cases other
than where the incest has been consummated, e.g., where the desire
has existed, proved intolerable and been diverted-with a "flight" into
homosexuality, gerontophilia (sexual desire for persons much older
than oneself; in this case, for parent-substitutes), fetishism, etc.77 The
guilt may be conscious, but the fear and expectation of (self-) punish-
76. In some primitive and ancient societies young children seem capable of inter-
course with adults without any serious damage, but they are always in a social setting
where adult-child sexual relations are not strongly condemned by an incest taboo. See
R. MASTERS, FORBIDDEN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND MORALITY (1962).
77. R. MASTERS, PATTERNS OF INCEST: A PSYCHO-SOCIAL STUDY OF INCEST BASED ON
CLINICAL AND HISTORICAL DATA 195 (1963).
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ment can be unconscious motivations, just as the guilt itself can be
repressed into the unconscious along with an unrequited wish for in-
cest. The incest involved need not be the genuine act, but, psychologi-
cally, it can be a symbolic act representing the essence of evil (as de-
fined by society and its criminal law), and serve, for example, as a
means of expressing anti-social rebellion. Thus the symbolic, but
equally damaging, act of incest can be committed for reasons quite
apart from the simple gratification of sexual appetite. Incest and its
psychological manifestations can be the almost perfect outlet for
sado-masochism. The psychological harm can be made more grievous
by a strong incest taboo that is reinforced by the criminal law.
Insofar as a child may properly need the protection of law from the
sexual advances or threats of seduction from parents and close rela-
tives, the needed protection is already fully supplied by other provi-
sions of the Proposed Code. The crime of incest is redundant and
unnecessary. The Proposed Code provides that "any person who
communicates with a child under the age of fourteen years of age for
immoral purposes" commits a misdemeanor;78 that a person commits
rape in the first degree, punishable by not less than twenty years im-
prisonment or by fine of $10,000, or both, or by death, (which are
greater penalties than those provided for incest) if "such person en-
gages in sexual intercourse with another person.., who is less than
eleven years old;"17 9 that a person commits rape in the second degree,
punishable by ten years imprisonment or by fine of $10,000, or both,
(which are greater penalties than those provided for incest) if "such
person [who is eighteen years or more] engages in sexual intercourse
with another person.., who is less than fourteen years old;"'80 that a
person is guilty of rape in the third degree, punishable by five years
imprisonment, or by $5,000 fine, or both, (the punishment provided
for incest) if the prosecuted person is over twenty and has had inter-
course with a person who is less than sixteen. 81 Additional protection
for a child's personality growth and development is found in the pro-
78. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.015.
79. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.040.
80. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.050.
81. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060. However, unlike the incest provisions, the rape offenses
and the first two sexual contact provisions of the Code require corroboration of the vic-
tim's testimony. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010. See note entitled "Sexual Offenses" at page
234 of this volume.
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visions defining the crime of sexual contact 82 which is an offense oc-
curing inter alia whenever anyone touches the sexual or other intimate
parts of another person under the ages of eleven or fourteen for the
purpose of gratifying a.sexual desire of either party even though the
actor mistakenly believes the victim is older. A person can be con-
victed of both statutory rape and statutory sexual conduct. Further
protection is provided by the criminal attempt section which punishes
the attempt to commit any of the above crimes with penalties that are
one step below those for the completed crime; i.e., an attempted but
unsuccessful first degree felony other than murder is punished as a
second degree felony. 83 The crime of criminal solicitation affords still
further protection, indicating that a person is guilty "when, with intent
to promote or facilitate the commission of a specific offense, he offers
to give or gives money or other thing of value to another to engage in
specific conduct which would constitute such offense or which would
establish complicity of such other person in its commission or at-
tempted commission." 84
The utilitarian reason for protecting the personality growth and
development of a dependent child is fully, even redundantly, satisfied
by the above provisions of the Proposed Code. In most instances, the
punishment that is prescribed is more severe than that set forth by the
incest provision. The criminal offense of incest is simply not needed to
protect the legitimate secular value that is presented by a child's in-
terest in proper psychic growth and development. Are there any other
values that should be protected by an incest provision of the criminal
law? As one author has put it:85
There seem to be only two [more] claims. One is the genetic risk that
inbreeding leads to the birth of defective children. That reason is
somewhat farfetched. Incestuous relationships are rarely carried on for
the purpose of procreation. And geneticists are not at all agreed that
inbreeding is dysgenic: its effect is only to accentuate the recessive
82. This crime has three degrees. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.070-.090.
83. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.010(3)(b).
84. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.020. This section and the attempt section adequately protect
against the fear of the Judiciary Committee that the risk of undue influence, short of
force, over adopted and stepchildren would not be covered by the rape provisions of
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.040-.060.
85. PACKER, supra note 15, at 3 15-16. For discussion of principles regarding the
genetic point see W. SCHULL & J. NEEL, THE EFFECTS OF INBREEDING ON JAPANESE
CHILDREN (1965).
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traits of the parents. If they share unhealthy recessive traits, the effects
will be bad; if they share healthy recessive traits, the effects will be
good. The other claim is that criminal punishment is required to place
a secular sanction behind a widely held religious or moral tenet; and a
related assertion is that the community regards incest with such in-
tense hostility that failure to condemn it will result in loss of respect
for the criminal law generally. This is simply a stark claim for the en-
forcement of morals through the criminal law. It must be rejected on
the ground that in the absence of any claim that the conduct in ques-
tion is injurious to others or to those who engage in it, people should
be free of the peculiar condemnatory restraint of the criminal law. If
carrying on an open and notorious incestuous relationship gives of-
fense to the community, there may be room for its prohibition as a
nuisance, although it is questionable whether the community's injury
is anything but self-inflicted, unless there is an exceptionally open
flaunting of the sexual character of the relationship. Although it
strikes most of us as bizarre and repugnant, there seems no good
reason to prevent incestuous preferences from expressing themselves
among adults. Civil sanctions such -as the non-recognition of inces-
tuous marriages should be sufficent.
V. OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES
Nowhere does overcriminalization more obviously demonstrate the
improper use of the criminal law to enforce a particular set of morals
than in the definitions of the sexual crimes, especially those criminal-
izing extramarital or "abnormal" sexual intercourse.86 On the other
hand, these crimes are seldom enforced. Thurman Arnold may have
perceived the truth when he wrote that these crimes "are unenforced
because we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because we
want to preserve our morals. 87 No one believes that the requirements
set by our sex laws are fulfilled by the vast majority of our citizens,
86. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.100 (1959):
Every person who shall carnally know in any manner any animal or bird; or who
shall carnally know any male or female person by the anus or with the mouth or
tongue; or who shall voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge; or who shall at-
tempt sexual intercourse with a dead body, shall be guilty of sodomy and shall be
punished as follows:
(1) When such act is committed upon a child under the age of fifteen years, by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than twenty years.
(2) In all other cases by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than
ten years.
87. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935).
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including the most respectable, or by the police officers who may be
called upon to enforce them.88 Kinsey has estimated that as many as
ninety-five percent of American males may be potential criminals
under the definitions of these laws.89 An excellent book on the crim-
inal law describes the sex laws that currently exist in Washington and
in other states as follows:90
With the possible exception of sixteenth-century Geneva under John
Calvin, America has the most moralistic criminal law that the world
has yet witnessed. One area in which this moralism is most extensively
reflected is that of sexual behavior. In all states the criminal law is
used in an egregiously wide-ranging and largely ineffectual attempt to
regulate the sexual relationships and activities of citizens. Indeed, it is
as if the sex offense laws were designed to provide an enormous legis-
lative chastity belt encompassing the whole population and pro-
scribing everything but solitary and joyless masturbation and 'normal
coitus' inside wedlock.
When considering the possible criminalization of sex acts, the sub-
ject area must be divided into at least two separate parts: (1) those sex
acts occurring between consenting adults in private, and (2) all others.
When dealing with the restricted question of which, if any, sex acts
occurring between consenting adults in private should be criminalized,
the beginning point of wisdom is the recognition that the enforcement
of one particular group's morals upon other social groups through the
criminal law is a dubious business at best.91 And where a broad com-
munity consensus does not exist about a specific act of sexual behav-
ior, then the subject area is not proper for the criminal law.9 2 The
88. See generally J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL Ch. 3 (1966).
89. KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 392
(1948).
90. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL
15 (1970).
9 1. "Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the agency
of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which, in brief and crude terms, is not the law's busi-
ness." 14 REPORTS FROM COMMISSIONERS, INSPECTORS AND OTHERS. REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 48, paras. 61 and 62 [Cmnd.
247, London] (Wolfenden Report 1957). See also P. DEVLIN, THE EnFORCEMENT OF
MORALS (1959), and H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
92. Professor Packer has set forth the conditions under which the criminal law can
work best or worst, and the enforcement of almost all the sex crimes requires the crim-
inal law to function at its worst! PACKER, sutpra note 15. at 304:
Some of the reasons listed below for not invoking the Icriminal] sanction where
such behavior is concerned are self-explanatory; others will require some comment.
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basic reasons are: (1) no serious community harm results from usual
sex acts occurring between consenting adults in private; (2) there is
little evidence that criminal law has functioned as a deterrent in this
area; (3) law enforcement is most difficult and is frequently degrading
to both the suspects and law enforcement personnel (what should be
proper police surveillance and detection methods?) 93 and (4) there
seldom are any complainants-only the indiscreet need worry about
being prosecuted. Moreover, imprisonment frequently does nothing to
reform the offender. For example, the consequence of criminalizing
private, adult acts of homosexuality is, in Judge Craven's words, "a
little like throwing Bre'r Rabbit into the briarpatch." 94
Concern for these problems of overcriminalization underlie the
provisions of the Model Penal Code95 which has served as the model
(1) Rarity of enforcement creates a problem of arbitrary police and prosecu-
torial discretion.
(2) The extreme difficulty of detecting such conduct leads to undesirable police
practices.
(3) The existence of the proscription tends to create a deviant subculture.
(4) Widespread knowledge that the law is violated with impunity by thousands
every day creates disrespect for law generally.
(5) No secular harm can be shown to result from such conduct.
(6) The theoretical availability of criminal sanctions creates a situation in which
extortion and, on occasion, police corruption may take place.
(7) There is substantial evidence that the moral sense of the community no
longer exerts strong pressure for the use of criminal sanctions.
(8) No utilitarian goal of criminal punishment is substantially advanced by pro-
scribing private adult consensual sexual conduct.
93. E.g., Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
643 (1966).
94. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
95. As the drafters of the Model Penal Code state:
As in the case of illicit heterosexual relations, existing law is substantially unen-
forced, and there is no prospect of real enforcement except against cases of vio-
lence, corruption of minors and public solicitation. Statutes that go beyond that
permit capricious selection of a very few cases for prosecution and serve primarily
the interest of blackmailers. Existence of the criminal threat probably deters some
people from seeking psychiatric or other assistance for their emotional problems;
certainly conviction and imprisonment are not conducive to cures. Further, there is
the fundamental question of the protection to which every individual is entitled
against state interference in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others.
Lastly, the practicalities of police administration must be considered. Funds and
personnel for police work are limited, and it would appear to be poor policy to use
them to any extent in this area when large numbers of atrocious crimes remain
unsolved. Even the necessary utilization of police in cases involving minors or
public solicitation raises special problems of police morale, because of the entrap-
ment practices that enforcement seems to require, and the temptation to bribery
and extortion.
M.P.C. § 305.17, Comment at 278 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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for many of the recently revised criminal laws of other states.96 Wash-
ington's Judiciary Committee took a step toward the development of a
sane sex code for this state when it too adopted the principle, candi-
dly stated, that its proposed chapter on sex crimes "rests on a view
that the criminal law is an ineffective and injurious device for at-
tempting to regulate private, consensual adult sexual behavior" and
that "whatever society may think of, for instance, private consensual
adult homosexual conduct, experience indicates that the imposition of
criminal sanctions has not changed homosexuals' inclinations, nor has
it produced any notable decrease in homosexuality in our society." 97
A. Rape (Homosexual, Heterosexual, Statutory and Viking)
The Proposed Code's overall treatment of rape98 reflects the afore-
mentioned principle and is enlightened. It defines "sexual intercourse"
96. See, e.g., Part V, Sexual Offenses, H.R. 20, 1972 Legislature, Hawaii (signed by
the Governor as Act 9 on April 7, 1972).
97. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060, Comment at 189. Thus, the crimes of sodomy (WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.79.100 (1959) and adultery (WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.110 (1959)) are
dropped; other crimes are covered elsewhere. An example is lewdness (WAsH. REv.
CODE § 9.79.120 (1959)), which is covered by the chapter on public indecency (R.W.C.C.
ch. 9A.88) as is indecent exposure. Clearly, this is the right course. For example, con-
sider adultery, which is in reality another imaginary crime: "Analysis of Reports of
Washington Appellate cases indicated that no adultery case has reached the Washington
Supreme Court since 1923." R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.64.010-.020, Comment at 279. There is
considerable room for doubt that the criminalization of adultery in Washington can be
shown to have had any appreciable impact on the behavior of married persons in this
state. The rarity of prosecution for adultery in light of the frequency of its occurrence
creates problems of arbitrary police and prosecutorial discretion, as well as contempt
and cynical disrespect for law. It is a crime in which all police detection methods are
suspect and generally involve invasions of privacy. When it is made known, adultery
frequently is brought to a prosecutor's attention by a hurt, irate and jealous spouse bent
on using the criminal law as a means of revenge. There seems to be little public pressure
in favor of the criminalization of adultery. It is one thing to retain crimes, even though
difficult of enforcement, but quite another to have crimes which are not intended to be
taken seriously. The Judiciary Committee wisely decided that adultery is a crime we
can do without.
98. I do not deal with the three proposed crimes of sexual contact in the first, second
and third degrees. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.070-.090. Sexual contact "means any touching of
the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, done for the pur-
pose of gratifying sexual desire of either party." R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(a). This defini-
tion is quite broad and includes much behavior that also is included under the rape defi-
nitions. Basically, sexual contact seems to encompass all rape behavior up to but not
including penetration, which is the additional element required for rape. Apparently, in
the usual rape situation the rapist would be guilty of both crimes. Since corroboration of
testimony is required for a conviction of rape but not for a conviction of sexual contact
in the third degree (R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010), prosecutors may choose to charge defend-
ants with this crime as well as third degree rape and attempted rape where the corrobor-
ating evidence is weak.
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broadly, encompassing the usual genital relations plus "any act of
sexual conduct between persons not married to each other involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anu's of another." 99
Thus, with the exception of masturbating another (which is included
under the definition of "sexual contact"00); this concept of "sexual
intercourse" includes homosexual as well as heterosexual acts. The
Proposed Code then proceeds to criminalize all types of genuine, in-
voluntary rape with a catchall crime of "sexual misconduct" which is
completed whenever any "person engages in sexual intercourse with
another person without the latter's consent."'' Moreover, forcible
rape, homosexual or heterosexual, regardless of adult or minor status,
is made a separate first-degree crime punishable by twenty years im-
prisonment or a $10,000 fine, or both.10 2
Statutory rape is divided into two basic crimes, and several additional
crimes' 03 which admit as a defense a reasonable belief of fact as to the
ages of sixteen and eighteen. 04 Statutory rape in the first degree is a
strict liability crime, occurring whenever any person regardless of age,
engages in sexual intercourse with another "who is less than eleven
years old."'105 Second degree statutory rape, also a strict liability of-
99. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(l). However, "persons living together as man and wife
are married for purposes of this chapter, regardless of the legal status of their relation-
ship otherwise, while spouses living apart under a decree of judicial separation are not
married to one another for purposes of this chapter." R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(3). These
qualifications are salutary; yet one wonders about the legal status of those sixteen to
twenty year olds who are living together in communes, but not as "man and wife."
100. See note 98, supra.
101. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.030.
102. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.040.
103. Given the broad definitions of "sexual intercourse" and "sexual contact" one
would believe that heterosexual and homosexual rape would be treated equally by the
Judiciary Committee. But that committee added two additional crimes covering only
homosexual rape. One occurg when sexual intercourse takes place between persons of
the same sex and the "actor" is twenty-one years or more and the other person is less
than eighteen, R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060(l)(d); the second occurs when the "actor" is nine-
teen years or more and the other person is less than sixteen, R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060(1)(c).
The penalty for both offenses is identical; both are defined as rape in the third degree,
and a reasonable mistake of the fact of age is a defense. The age cutoffs seem to have
been selected arbitrarily. Another provision of the Proposed Code also allows reason-
able mistake of age as a defense and makes sexual intercourse criminal if the "actor" is
twenty years old or. more and the other person is sixteen or less. R.W.C.C. §
9A.44.060(1)(b). But this section applies to both heterosexual and homosexual statutory
rape and seems sufficient to me. I would eliminate the two additional crimes applying
only to homosexuals, thereby providing equal protection of the law to all.
104. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(2)(b).
105. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.040(1)(b). It also occurs if the sexual intercourse takes place
by forcible compulsion.
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fense, occurs when the sexual intercourse is with another "who is less
than fourteen years old"'106 if "the actor is eighteen years old or
more."10 7
Thus, since persons under sixteen are deemed incapable of consent,
voluntary heterosexual intercourse between young persons over six-
teen and under eighteen years of age is not criminalized. One can
sympathize with the Judiciary Committee's laudable intent not to cri-
minalize heterosexual relations between teenagers between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen as statutory rape. It serves no utilitarian purpose
to do so. However, the defining language may create a construction
problem when determining who qualifies as an "actor," especially
where the criminally forbidden sexual intercourse takes place between
consenting teenagers in the usual situation. Nowadays young boys and
girls are more sexually aggressive, knowledgeable and sophisticated
than this provision reflects. It is not always true that the girl or boy
who is almost sixteen is a bewildered, passive person who is seduced
by a male or female who invariably is the aggressive "actor." The
moving party, or "actor," may well be under sixteen. Assuming that it
is proper to use the criminal sanction in this situation, the problem
can be eliminated by striking the word "actor" and in its place in-
serting the words "other person." A second problem exists in the rela-
tionship between the two statutory rape statutes. If an "actor" over
eighteen years engages in sexual intercourse with a person less than
eleven, then the prosecutor seems to have full discretion to choose
between the two crimes, with important differences in penalty hanging
in the balance.
A third problem is presented by an anomaly in the Proposed Code.
Since a person under sixteen years of age is deemed incapable of con-
senting, voluntary heterosexual intercourse between teenagers under
106. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.050(1)(b).
107. Id. This crime also occurs when sexual intercourse takes place between persons
of any age, but without consent because one of the persons "is incapable of consent by
reason of being physically helpless." R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.050(l)(a). Another crime, rape
in the third degree, R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060(l)(a), occurs when sexual intercourse takes
place with a person "who is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective
or mentally incapacitated." Finally, if a person is less than sixteen years and voluntarily
engages in sexual intercourse with another who is twenty years or more, rape in the third
degree occurs. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060(l)(b). However, in this last situation a reasonable
belief that the person was sixteen years of age functions as a defense. R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.44.020(2)(b).
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sixteen is criminalized as "sexual misconduct," a gross misdemeanor.
On the other hand, if the teenage "actor" in this situation is not more
than five years older than the "other person" who, in turn, is under
sixteen but over fourteen, then they do not commit the crime of
"sexual contact," which includes all the behavior of sexual foreplay up
to penetration. The reason is that R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.090 affords an
affirmative defense to the crime of "sexual contact" when "the other
person's lack of consent was due solely to incapacity to consent be-
cause he was less than sixteen years old; and such other person was
fourteen years old or more; and the actor was less than five years
older than such other person." Thus, the Proposed Code presents the
anomalous situation that heterosexual teenagers under sixteen can
voluntarily fondle each other in all types of erotic sexual foreplay, in-
cluding masturbating another to orgasm, without any possibility of
criminality; however, if they take the step of penetration and engage in
voluntary heterosexual intercourse, they immediately commit the
crime of "sexual misconduct." The commentary to the Proposed Code
nowhere discusses the justifications for this strange set of affairs. I can
only believe that it must have been due to an oversight that will be
corrected. The proper way to harmonize the proposed provisions and
to eliminate the anomaly is to provide that the affirmative defense af-
forded by R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.090 applies also to "sexual misconduct"
and to "rape in the third degree," as well as to "sexual contact." This
harmonization takes due account of the actual facts of modern-day
teenage sexual behavior.
B. Prostitution
Regrettably, the Judiciary Committee was not consistent in the ap-
plication of its principle that private, consensual acts of sexual be-
havior by adults should not be criminalized. In a chapter different
from that on sex crimes (i.e., the chapter on public indecency) the
Committee proposes to criminalize the act of prostitution, s08 whether
108. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.020. Prostitution is a misdemeanor (ninety days or $500, or
both) except when the person has been convicted of the offense on three or more pre-
vious occasions. Then it is a gross misdemeanor carrying a penalty of one year's impris-
onment or a fine of $1,000, or both.
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heterosexual or homosexual,109 patronizing a prostitute, 10 and pro-
moting' or permitting" 2 prostitution.
The criminalization of the sexual act of prostitution, itself, is essen-
tially the enforcement of morals, usually promoted by those who see it
as sin. Some persons, seeking to avoid this charge, focus on prostitu-
tion's commercial aspects and its relation to organized crime. But or-
ganized crime seems to have moved on to more lucrative areas and
those who advance this argument refuse to criminalize other business
practices on this ground, including those that have been infiltrated by
organized crime, e.g., the business of making loans."13 In any event,
the Proposed Code gives no justifying reason for the Judiciary Com-
mittee's breach of its own principle. We are left with two nagging
questions. What is the specific, secular harm that should be protected
against by criminalizing the act of prostitution when done in private
and between consenting adults? Does this harm provide a compelling,
secular reason for overriding our traditional preference for adult
freedom? It should always be remembered that in a free society the
burden of justifying a restriction on freedom is on those who seek to
do so, and not vice-versa.
Prostitution has endured in all ages and has survived all types of
attack. Strict criminal law enforcement seems not to have deterred
prostitution but rather to have changed its modes of operation."14
Given its persistence throughout human history, prostitution must
109. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.035 provides that it is no defense to the crimes of prostitu-
tion and patronizing a prostitute if the sex partners are of the same sex or if a female
agrees to pay the fee to a male.
110. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.030. Patronizing is a violation and occurs when one solic-
itor agrees to pay a fee to any other person for sexual intercourse to be engaged in by
himself and the recipient or by a third party.
111. Promoting prostitution in the first degree, punishable as a second degree
felony, occurs whenever a person either uses force or intimidation or profits from the
prostitution of a person less than seventeen. It is a second degree offense, punishable as
a third degree felony, when a person "advances prostitution" by managing, supervising,
controlling or owning," in whole or in part, a house of prostitution, and it is third degree
prostitution, punishable as a gross misdemeanor, when a person knowingly profits from
prostitution. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.88.050-.070.
112. This crime is a misdemeanor and occurs when a person has possession or con-
trol of premises which he knows are being used for prostitution and fails to make a rea-
sonable effort to halt such use. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.080.
113. See S. HILLS, CRIME, POWER AND MORALITY 102-44 (1971) and P. MAAS, THE
VALACHI PAPERS 274-75 (1968) for discussions of the sources of income of organized
crime.
114. See G. ScoTT, THE HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION (1936); J. MCCABE, THE STORY
OF THE WORLD'S OLDEST PROFESSION (1932); W. SANGER, THE HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION
(1921).
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serve a social function fulfilling a human need. It'will probably con-
tinue to exist. An argument advanced favoring prostitution is that it
provides an outlet for sexual impulses that otherwise would be mani-
fested by rape or other kinds of anti-social behavior. Definitive re-
search remains to be done on this argument, but treating it as an hy-
pothesis, one must grant its initial plausibility. If it should prove to be
true, then the prostitute is a valuable citizen indeed, ranking equally
with some of the police, providing the community with a large
measure of protection from sexual depredations.
Criminalizing prostitution produces unfortunate effects on law en-
forcement which may well outweigh whatever secular good the Judi-
ciary Committee sought to achieve by criminalizing it. Kinsey esti-
mates that more than two-thirds of America's white males will have at
least one sexual experience with a prostitute. 115 Facing the magnitude
of the law enforcement problem posed by prostitution, Professor
Kadish writes:"l 6
The costs, on the other hand, of making the effort are similar to those
entailed in enforcing the homosexual laws--diversion of police re-
sources; encouragement of use of illegal means of police control
(which, in the case of prostitution, take the form of knowingly un-
lawful harassment arrests to remove suspected prostitutes from the
streets; and various entrapment devices, usually the only means of
obtaining convictions); degradation of the image of law enforcement;
discriminatory enforcement against the poor; and official corruption.
Graphic illustration of the accuracy of Professor Kadish's views on the
misuse of the police is provided by Professor Jerome Skolnick who
presents a vivid description of "trolling," the technique used by cus-
tomers and police of driving slowly in areas frequented by prostitutes
in an attempt to pick them up without requiring them to solicit the
drivers. It all gets to be quite sophisticated. But is it a proper use of
our limited numbers of law enforcement personnel during a time
when so much serious crime is occurring? Can this degrading use of
the police be justified on the ground that it promotes moral virtue?
The speaker is a police officer with the vice squad:117
115. KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEVHAIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 597
(1948). While the statistics are twenty-four years old and times have changed, the gen-
eral point still holds.
116. Kadish, The Crises of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 162 (1967).
117. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 103 (1966). Another example:
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The broads are wisening up, getting real hanky. One of them told
me she can always spot a cop because we never say, "Hey, baby, how
would you like to turn .a trick for ten bucks?" which is what a lot of
these trollers say when one of these broads looks good to them. We got
to wait for them to set the price, otherwise we don't stand a chance in
court. It doesn't matter how many times a broad's been convicted for
prostitution. If we set the price, we got no case. The law says we en-
trapped her.
I was trolling one night and a broad walked over to the car and
said, "Mister, I'm in trouble, I could use a little money."
I said, "Well, I might be able to help you out, provided I get some-
thing for my money."
She said, "You'll get something, but how much you givin'?"
I said, "How much you asking?"
She said, "How much you offerin' to pay?"
"Well," I said, "how's about a dollar?"
"Oh, mister," she said, "you must be a policeman"--and walked
off.
You see, Jerry, we got to get them to set the price and for what,
straight date, half-and-half, French or Greek. Otherwise, we're doing
the soliciting.
We are not going to stamp out prostitution by using our police in
this manner. Neither are we going to stop the spread of venereal dis-
ease through infrequent and haphazard law enforcement. Complete
enforcement is out of the question because it would place too great a
burden on the police and the law enforcement techniques frequently
invade the right to privacy. Furthermore, illegal prostitution always
presents the possibility of police corruption through bribes given by
pimps, prostitutes, owners of bars the prostitutes frequent and owners
of hotels where the sex act occurs. Even when arrested prostitutes are
"One of the now more experienced vice control officers reported that on his first night
with the squad he used his own station wagon to pick up a girl, while an experienced vice
control man was hidden in a large cardboard carton in the rear seat. He said that
this was probably his most difficult arrest. As he put it:
'I took the car to a vacant lot that she picked out. After I stopped the car, I paid
her the ten dollars that we'd agreed on for a straight fuck. She took the money
and stashed it in her bra, and then pulled her Capri pants way the hell off. Just
then Rogers stuck his head out of the cardboard box. Rogers was smiling and when
she saw him she flipped. She began screaming and biting and scratching. She
tore my shirt and she tore my jacket... we practically had to carry her into the
station.' "
Id. at 105-06. What is society's gain because of this kind of law enforcement?
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not often convicted. Since judges are not moral monsters, prostitutes
frequently receive light jail sentences when they are convicted. If the
penalty is a fine, many immediately return to prostitution to get the
necessary money. Finally, a double standard exists because the prosti-
tute's customers are not prosecuted equally. The overall result is a te-
dious, degrading, expensive process of law enforcement that produces
few, if any useful results. Prostitutes are not deterred, nor are they re-
formed; miany are drug addicts who prostitute themselves to get
money to buy illegal drugs which are expensive because they are il-
legal.
Prostitution continues on as it has in all ages of human history.
Unless the Judiciary Committee can produce reasons sufficiently
compelling to override the considerations advanced here, and suffi-
cient to justify criminalizing prostitution that occurs privately between
consenting adults, then that sex act itself" 8 should not be made a
crime. The legislature should follow the English practice which crim-
inalizes neither the sex act nor an inoffensive act of solicitation,
whether by male or female." 9 The act of an offensive public solicita-
tion could be made a public nuisance. The legislature may also want
to establish controls to guard against venereal disease and other prob-
lems related to prostitution.
VI. MARIJUANA, NARCOTICS AND OTHER DRUGS
America's approach to the problems presented by drug abuse 20 is
chaotic, reflecting fundamental ambivalences. We freely allow the use
118. I make no argument that other aspects of the process should not be criminal-
ized, e.g., offensive public solicitation. But neither the act itself nor its necessary fea-
tures, e.g., using a room, should be criminalized without a sufficiently compelling
reason.
119. This is discussed in PACKER, supra note 15, at 331:
It seems that prostitution, like obscenity and like other sexual offenses, should be
viewed as a nuisance offense whose gravamen is not the act itself, or even the ac-
companying commercial transaction, but rather its status as a public indecency.
That is the approach taken in England, where law enforcement does not seem to be
plagued with the self-imposed problems that our prostitution controls engender. In
order to curb effectively the use of undesirable police techniques, it might also be
desirable to provide that a conviction for public solicitation should require evi-
dence that the person solicited was offended thereby and was neither a policeman
nor someone in the hire of the police.
120. By drug abuse I mean the use of any drug to such an extent that it interferes
with the user's physical or mental health, or his capacity to adjust successfully to sur-
rounding society.
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of one addictive drug: alcohol, which takes a huge social toll and also
produces large numbers of user-deaths from cirrhosis and other al-
cohol-related diseases. 121 Heavy tobacco use produces emphysema,
lung cancer and circulatory diseases, all of which do vast amounts of
damage. 122 Even the caffeine found in coffee' 23 and tea may be addic-
tive,124 potentially causative of genetic damage125 and otherwise as
dangerous126 as the banned cyclamates.' 27 On the other hand, we
criminalize the possession and use of marijuana, 12 8 a non-narcotic,
about which the Report of the National Commission on Marihuana
and Drug Abuse states, "neither the marihuana user nor the drug itself
can be said to constitute a danger to public safety."'21 9 The entire role
of the law in drug control needs to be rethought. 130 Special considera-
tion should be given to the creation of a new system of controls that is
radically different from our current, ineffective approach. The control
system should not tempt law enforcement officers to violate the guar-
antees of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Observations made
by Thurmond Arnold during Prohibition, in 1935, have been further
corroborated in the subsequent thirty-seven years and remain applic-
able to current marijuana and drug control practices: 131
121. "[A] lcohol has probably caused more disease than any other drug in man's
history .... There are at least 2,500,000 socially useless alcoholics in this country and
about as many more whose productivity is curtailed by alcohol...." Model, Mass Drug
Catastrophes and the Roles of Science and Technology, 156 SCIENCE 346, 347 (1967).
See also E. BLOOMQUIST, MARIJUANA: THE SECOND TRIP 180-81 (1971); L. GOODMAN &
A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 135-44 (1970); R. BLUM,
SOCIETY AND DRUGS 284-85 (1969).
122. SeeJ. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEw PROHIBITION 201, 314 (1970).
123. The use of coffee was once criminalized and made punishable by imprison-
ment or death. R. BLUM, SOCIETY AND DRUGS 11-12 (1969).
124. See Goldstein, Kaizer and Whitby, Psychotropic Effects of Caffeine in Man,
IV. Quantitative and Qualitative Differences Associated with Habituation to Coffee, 10
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 489 (1969).
125. See Goldstein and Warren, Lack of Relationship Between Gastric Carcinoma
and Intake of Beverages Containing Coffee, 15 CANCER 1261 (1962); and Kuhlmann,
Fromme, Heege and Ostertag, The Mutagenic Action of Caffeine in Higher Organisms,
28 CANCER RESEARCH 2375 (1968).
126. See Cole, Coffee Drinking and Cancer in the Lower Urinary Tract, 1 LANCET
1335 (1971).
127. See Price, Biava, Oser, Vogin, Steinfeld and Ley, Bladder Tumors in Rats Fed
Cyclohexylamine or High Doses of a Mixture of Cyclamate and Saccharin, 167 SCIENCE
1131 (1970). See also 34 Fed. Reg. 17063-64 (1969).
128. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.40.060-.150 (1959).
129. NATIONAL COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING 78 (1972).
130. An excellent article doing much rethinking is Kaplan, The Role of the Law in
Drug Control, 1971 DUKE L. J. 1065.
131. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 164 (1935).
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Before [prohibition] the problem of search and seizures was a minor
one. Thereafter, searches and seizures became the weapon of attack
which could be used against prohibition enforcement. For every 'dry'
speech on the dangers of disobedience, there was a 'wet' oration on the
dangers of invading the privacy of the honie. Reflected in the courts
the figures are startling. In six states selected for the purpose of study
we find 19 search and seizure cases appealed in the 12 years preceding
Prohibition and 347 in the 12 years following.
Washington's Proposed Code does not face squarely the problem of
drug abuse. It addresses parts of the problem in a piecemeal fashion.
Under one proposed provision a person is guilty of a misdemeanor of
public intoxication if he appears in public under the influence of alco-
hol, or if he appears in public under the influence of "narcotics or
other drug [sic], not therapeutically administered, to such a degree
that he endangers himself or other persons or property, or annoys per-
sons in his vicinity.' u3 2 A person commits the violation of loitering if
he "remains in any place with one or more persons for the purpose of
unlawfully using or possessing a narcotic or dangerous drug.' u33
Non-pathological intoxication, including intoxication by alcohol,
drugs or other "substances," is not a.defense to any crime unless it
negates an element of the offense or unless it is induced involuntarily. 134
Basically, this piecemeal approach relies on the existing framework
of ineffective laws.
A. Marijuana
Washington's basic approach to the problems of marijuana and
narcotic drugs is not found in the Proposed Criminal Code where it
should be, nor in the crimes and punishment chapter of the Revised
Code of Washington (R.C.W.). It is in the R.C.W. chapter on food
and drugs. In 1969, the legislature passed the Uniform Narcotic Drug
Act135 which does not include marijuana, and it also amended the
chapter on poison and dangerous-drugs 36 to include marijuana, crim-
inalizing its possession, sale, gift, barter, exchange or distribution in
132. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.050(1).
133. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060(1)(c).
134. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.080.
135. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 69.33.220-.412 (1969).
136. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.40.060-.150 (1969).
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any way. Marijuana, a non-narcotic drug, should be considered sepa-
rately from the narcotic drugs. 137 But Washington's law should be
more extensively revised in light of recent developments. For example,
the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse 138 recom-
mends that "possession in private of marihuana for personal
use.., no longer be an offense," and that "distribution in private of
small amounts of marihuana for no remuneration or insignificant re-
muneration not involving a profit.., no longer be an offense." 139
Given these recommendations and the important findings of the
Commission,140 plus a desire to remove marijuana's profits from crim-
inal elements, it is appropriate for Washington to handle the problem
of marijuana the same way it handles the problem of alcohol: through
its state liquor stores. A similar recommendation is set forth by Pro-
fessor Kaplan, one of America's leading experts on the role of law in
drug control. He sees many social advantages: 14
137. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. McCabe, 49 I11. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d
407 (1971) has ruled that a state classification of marijuana under its Narcotic Drug Act
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 22-1 et seq. (1969)) instead of under its Drug Abuse Con-
trol Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-112, §§ 801 et seq. (1969)) constituted a violation of
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court compared marijuana
with the opiates and cocaine, the drugs embraced by the Narcotic Drug Act which re-
quired a mandatory ten-year sentence on first conviction, and with the barbituates,
amphetamines and hallucinogens, the drugs embraced by the Drug Abuse Control Act
which provided for a maximum sentence of one year and allowed probation for a first
offender, and found that the classification of marijuana with the "hard" drugs was un-
constitutional.
138. Act ofOct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-5 13, Part F.
139. NATIONAL COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, supra note 129, at 154.
140. For example, the Commission found: "In sum, the weight of the evidence is
that marihuana does not cause violent or aggressive behavior; if anything marihuana
generally serves to inhibit the expression of such behavior." Id. at 73. "Similarly, pre-
vious estimates of marihuana's role in causing crime and insanity were based on quite
erroneous information." Id. at 23. "The fact should be emphasized that the over-
whelming majority of marihuana users do not progress to other drugs. They either re-
main with marihuana or forsake its use in favor of alcohol." Id. at 87-88. "In all its stud-
ies, the Commission found no evidence of chromosome damage or teratogenic or muta-
genic effects due to cannabis at doses commonly used by man." Id. at 84. "No objective
evidence of specific pathology of brain tissues has been documented. This fact contrasts
sharply with the well-established brain damage of chronic alcoholism." Id. at 85. "Early
findings [were made in] studies of chronic (up to 41 years), heavy (several ounces per
day) cannabis users in Greece and Jamaica.... These studies in Greece and Jamaica
report minimum physical abnormalities in the cannabis users as compared with their
non-using peers. Minimal abnormalities in pulmonary function have been observed in
some cases of heavy and very heavy smokers of potent marihuana preparations (ganja or
hashish). However, one study concluded the cause was smoking in general. no matter
what the substance. The other study could not express any conclusion .... " Id. at 84-85.
141. Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1065, 1100. See
also Stern, Reforming Marijuana Laws, 58 A.B.A.J. 727 ( 1972); J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA
-THE NEW PROIITION (1970).
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The application to marijuana, however, of a licensing system similar
to that presently applied to alcohol changes [the prospects] drasti-
cally. First, marijuana would no longer be the most widely, used illegal
drug in the United States; nor, for that matter, would it be the most
widely used legal drug-alcohol, and tobacco would still vie for that
distinction. Second, marijuana would no longer be the first illegal, or
the first legal, drug used by those who later use more dangerous sub-
stances. Third, marijuana, once classified with the legal drugs, would no
longer reflect its popularity upon the illegal drugs. Fourth, the removal
of the disparity between the legal treatment of marijuana and alcohol
would allow more honesty in educating about both-while at the same
time increasing the credibility of presently honest warnings about the
more dangerous drugs. And, fifth, nothing will damage the illegal drug
dealing subculture as much as exposure to honest competition by
legitimate businessmen.
One of the many advantages of decriminalizing marijuana is the
impact that it would have on youth. Today, in large part because mar-
ijuana use is illegal, the marijuana user is frequently seen by teenagers
as an adventurous hero of the counterculture; his image is that of a
bold challenger of the Establishment's authority and of society's con-
ventions. This view fits nicely with the psychology of adolescent rebel-
lion, and can carry over to other drugs, including heroin. Severe crim-
inal sanctions serve to create the myth of a persecuted minority, and
an ideology springs up around marijuana. Decriminalization would
eliminate this myth and status, tending to reduce it more to the level
of alcoholism-an addiction more to be pitied and treated as sick,
rather than idolized. Moreover, the popularity of marijuana would no
longer carry over to the other drugs.
Controlled legalization of marijuana is the path of wisdom. If the
current approach proves anything, it proves the inefficacy of the crim-
inal law to control marijuana. The costs of our existing policy are
growing, and, especially among the young, respect for law is eroding
because of disparate enforcement of the law.142 There is a serious
question whether the marijuana laws can be enforced in a manner
142. Expressions of concern have been registered about the extent to which current
marijuana laws encourage police misconduct, especially in the search and seizure areas.
See Bonnie and Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An In-
quiry into the Legal History of American Marihitana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971
(1970).
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consistent with constitutional definitions of fairness.1 43 Moreover,
short of creating a police state, it will be impossible to enforce the ex-
isting laws strictly enough to stamp out use of the drug. Our most
strenuous attempts to control the importation and distribution of mar-
ijuana have proved ineffective. Seldom a month passes without a
newspaper proclaiming that a "major source" of marijuana has been
located or destroyed, yet marijuana continues to be abundantly avail-
able. Severe criminal penalties serve to increase the risk, the price and
the rewards that flow to the criminal element. Severe penalties may
deter a few potential new users: the middle-class man who fears a
conviction, or the occasional college student. But overall, severe pen-
alties have done little to deter the use of marijuana and much to
promote nullification of the law. Every aspect of discretion is used to
minimize the impact of severe sanctions that are not, and cannot be
equally enforced. 144 A considerable amount of police, prosecutorial
and judicial time, effort, personnel and other resources are used to
enforce laws against sale, possession and use of marijuana. At a time
when the volume of serious crime is steadily increasing and the
burden on law enforcement agencies is growing more onerous, this use
of resources impairs the ability of criminal law enforcement to deal
effectively with more dangerous and threatening conduct.
B. Narcotics and Other Drugs
After prohibition, various crime organizations turned to illegal
gambling and to the illegal drug market where enormous profits
could, and still can, be made because of our current, ineffecfive ap-
proach to drug control. According to the estimates of the President's
Crime Commission, about 3,300 pounds of pure heroin a year are
smuggled into the United States and, on the average, "less than
one-tenth of this amount is seized by all enforcement agencies com-
bined.' 145 It takes about twenty-two pounds of opium, which can be
purchased on the black market for roughly $350, to make 2.2 pounds
143. See generally Project, Marihiuana Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement
and Administration in Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1499 (1968).
144. See e.g., Note, Possession of Marihuana in San Mateo County: Some Social
Costs of Criminalization, 22 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1969).
145. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 6 (1967).
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of pure heroin which will sell for at least $225,000 on the American
market when divided into doses containing from one to thirty percent
heroin. 146 Under these economic conditions, it is in the rational
self-interest of the organized suppliers actively to expand their market
by seeking new user-customers through a vigorous program of
pushing heroin. Pushers are usually addicts who get their supply of
heroin by pushing it. Addiction itself is the result of a complex inter-
action of.physical and psychological factors. Most addicts suffer from
various mental illnesses that can lead to a strong psychological need
for drugs; in this sense, some persons can be said to be addiction
prone.147 They tend to have personalities that blend together a mix-
ture of traits associated with neurosis, personality disorders and inade-
quate psyches.148 Generally, addicts are weak persons susceptible to
exploitation. 149
Drug addition is expensive, and it stimulates other types of crime as
addicts seek income to pay for their habit: prostitution, theft, burglary
146: Id.
147. The "intensity of the pleasure from opiates seems to vary with the degree to
which the individual may be called a neurotic or psychopath." MAURER & VOGEL,
NARCOTICS AND NARCOTIC ADDICTION 74 (2d ed.,- 1962). Some people can use addictive
drugs over long periods of time without becoming addicted:
The addiction-prone type, however, experiences much more than physical gratifica-
tion from his first experience with narcotics. He develops a psychological need or
craving which he is probably powerless to ignore and it is this psychological de-
pendence, also called habituation, which renders his subsequent addiction virtually
inevitable.
Bowman, Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Durham, 52 GEO.
LJ. 1017, 1036 (1965). But when addiction takes hold its impact is debilitating because
the addicting drugs are psychotoxic (mind poisoning):
A psychotoxic drug is any chemical substance capable of adducing mental effects
which leads to abnormal behavior. They affect or alter to a substantive extent, con-
sciousness, the ability to think, critical judgment, motivation, psychomotor coordi-
nation, and sensory perception.
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY CO/?lM'N ON NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE, FINAL REPORT I
(1963). Thus, where full addiction is present, and the addict lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate his criminality as would a normal person or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law, the addict should have the defense of mental disease or de-
fect.
148. AM. BAR FOUNDATION, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 22 (1962).
149. Support for this proposition may be found in the article by Chein and Rosen-
-feld, Juvenile Narcotics Use, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 52 (1957):
Psychiatric research into the personality ofjuvenile addicts indicates that adoles-
cents who become addicts have deep-rooted major personality disorders. These dis-
orders were evident in overt adjustment problems or in serious intrapsychic con-
flicts, usually... prior to their involvement with drugs.... In terms of personality
structure, one may say that the potential addict suffers from a weak ego, an inade-
quately functioning superego, and an inadequate masculine identification.
Id. at 59-60.
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and robbery. Almost half of the serious crimes that occur in America's
urban areas can be attributed to the activities of narcotic addicts, es-
pecially heroin addictions. About $500 million a year in property
crimes is attributed to addicts in the New York area alone.150The
Washington State Patrol's Drug Control Assistance Unit estimates that
"there are 5,000 heroin users in the state who steal $392 million
worth of property each year to support their habits."'151 The basic
reason for the magnitude of crime associated with addiction is the
high price of heroin. The basic reason for the high price of heroin is
our current criminal law. By criminalizing possession, use and sale of
narcotics, the government confers a monopoly position on organized
criminals willing to run the risks involved in supplying the drug. Enor-
mous profits are made because an addict's need is constant and he will
pay almost any price to buy narcotics. The black market enjoys a
steady demand. 5 2 The current criminal law operates very much like a
tariff-a crime tariff-serving to drive the price upwards. 53
To compound this irony, strict enforcement, or "war" on heroin, is
counterproductive. It has the consequence of increasing the risks to
the organized suppliers and the price of heroin to the addict. The ad-
dict must commit greater amounts of secondary crime to get the addi-
tional money needed to support his habit. On this analysis, a "war" on
heroin and a strict enforcement of existing law results in greater, not
lesser, amounts of total crime, increasing the rates of burglary and
robbery, as well as the danger to persons, making city life intolerable.
The magnitude of the figures shows that the current approach of
our criminal law grossly has failed to solve the social problem. Ironi-
cally, the "brunt of enforcement has fallen heavily on the user and the
addict,"'154 rather than on the organized suppliers. Effective law en-
forcement against the organizations is extremely difficult. Police cor-
ruption thrives on heroin traffic, and organized crime seems to have
increased its effectiveness by engaging in other types of crime: bribing
150. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
TASK FORCE REPORT, NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 6 (1967).
151. TheSeattle Post-Intelligencer, May 17, 1971. at 1, col. I.
152. For analysis, see Schelling, Economic Analysis of Organized Crimne, reprinted
in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. TASK
FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 114 (1967).
153. Packer, The Crime Tarrif, 33 AM. SCHOLAR 551 (1964).
154. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT, NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 8 (1967).
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and corrupting higher public officials, as well as diversifying its risks
and activities by moving into loan sharking and labor racketeering.' 55
The law enforcement techniques are often of questionable constitu-
tional validity and some involve the police in committing criminal
acts; such as intrusions that amount to illegal searches and seizures or
various forms of wiretapping, bugging or electronic eavesdropping.
Given the woeful consequences of our current criminal laws, given
that law enforcement has been criminogenic and given that there has
been no appreciable diminution in either the supply of narcotic drugs
or the drug problem, there is good reason to doubt that the existing
scheme of legal controls is worth preserving.
One fact is crucial: enormous amounts of money are involved in
illegal drug traffic. The initial energy that accounts for much drug ad-
diction and that stimulates secondary crime comes from the organized
suppliers. The way to end addict crime and to eliminate the criminal
organizations engaged in the illegal drug trade is to take the profit
away by decriminalizing narcotic drugs, especially heroin, making
them, or their substitutes such as methodone,156 easily and cheaply
available to addicts. Stimulated addict crime makes it more important
that narcotics be decriminalized than marijuana, but a rational crim-
inal code would decriminalize both.157 If private use and possession of
very small amounts of the drugs were not criminalized, and if drugs
were cheaply available, there would be neither a black market nor a
155. For a full description see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME (1967).
156. Methadone has been proven an effective means of treatment in Canada, ac-
cording to the PRESIDENT'S COMMN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 139 (1967):
In Canada, programs vary from Province to Province. Both British Columbia
and Ontario have been utilizing methadone treatment with some reported success.
In Vancouver, this drug is given to older addicts for a few months to ease the tran-
sition to abstinence. A committee of the Canadian Medical Association, in a state-
ment published in the CMA Journal (vol. 92, p. 1040, 1965), concluded that
methadone could be used for gradual withdrawal or prolonged maintenance and
recommended a series of safeguards to be followed by any physician attempting
maintenance therapy to insure that he was the only source of methadone for each
patient. Canadian law, as ours, is bound to good medical practice; the exact
wording is that doctors must be able to present credible evidence that the narcotic
is 'required for the condition for which the patient is receiving treatment.'
See also Goldstein, Heroin Addiction and the Role of Methadone in its Treatment,
26 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 291 (1972); Lennard, Epstein & Rosenthal, The Methadone
Illusion, 176 SCIENCE 881 (1972).
157. A contrary and disturbing trend exists toward criminalizing the possession and
use of many other drugs, such as LSD, amphetamines, barbiturates and tranquilizers.
Examples in Washington are WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.40.060-.150 (1961) and WASH.
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crime tariff. The economic incentive for pushing narcotics would be
reduced to that of a druggist selling aspirin. This proposal does not
mean that our criminal laws controlling importation, manufacture,
distribution or pushing of drugs should be changed or left unenforced.
Unauthorized persons engaging in the drug business for profit should
be vigorously prosecuted, and the knowing possession of excessive
quantities of a drug could be made a presumption of intent to sell. But
we could take a giant step forward if strict controls over the supply of
drugs were maintained while leaving the care of addicts in the hands
of governmentally controlled social-welfare agencies specifically cre-
ated for that purpose.
The Judiciary Committee should have faced this task squarely. It
should have decriminalized the acquisition, possession and use of
small amounts of drugs and their substitutes, and it should have set
forth detailed, careful controls over all aspects of supply. Such action
would have created a sounder, more effective system than any state
has yet evolved. Law enforcement officials would no longer be called
upon to dissipate their energies against drug users or addicts, nor be
REV. CODE §§ 9.47A.010-.050 (1969) on glue sniffing. The problem is wisely discussed
in PACKER, supra note 15, at 341-42:
Our woeful experience with narcotics and marijuana controls should have made
us a little more wary about this rush to invoke the criminal sanction. It seems par-
ticularly inappropriate in the case of drugs like the amphetamines, tranquilizers.
and barbiturates, all of which have acceptable medical uses. Ours is a drug-using
society, and self-medication is an important aspect of that use. Nothing but gratui-
tous misery will result from the occasional imposition of criminal conviction on a
person who possesses for his own use drugs for which he does not have a medical
prescription. Recent federal drug control legislation, although probably. more
far-reaching than is desirable, sets a useful precedent by failing to make possession,
unaccompanied by intent to sell or use, a criminal offense. Unfortunately, many of
the states have ignored this precedent, and have passed highly restrictive legislation
of their own.
In addition to running counter to well-established habits in the population, re-
pressive criminal legislation in this field creates an impossible enforcement
problem. Heroin and marijuana, at least, have to run the gauntlet of border con-
trol, since substantially all the supply comes in from abroad. The various 'dan-
gerous drugs' are all manufactured domestically. Furthermore, many of these drugs
can be synthesized at low cost in relatively simple laboratory operations. There is,
in short, very little prospect of effective control over the total supply and therefore
no prospect at all of keeping significant amounts of the supply out of illegal chan-
nels of distribution. Although the greatest possible control should be exerted
through federal licensing and inspection of manufacturing facilities, record-
keeping requirements for manufacturers and distributors, and other regulatory
devices, it seems quite inexpedient to rely on the criminal sanction as the primary
means of control. Sanctions such as injunctions, license revocations, and civil fines
are much better adapted to backing up ihose regulatory controls that can realisti-
cally be enforced.
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tempted to engage in illegal searches and seizures. They could concen-
trate their efforts against unauthorized suppliers and organized dis-
tributors who would have much less economic incentive to engage in
the activity.
VII. GAMBLING
Although gambling may be "a form of conduct unbefitting a being
with hunan capacities, '158 "law enforcement officials agree almost
unanimously that gambling is the greatest source of revenue for or-
ganized crime." 15 9 It takes many forms ranging from lotteries, to
off-track horse betting, to betting on sporting events such as college
football games, to large dice games and illegal casinos. Although there
is no accurate way of knowing the gross revenue derived from gam-.
bling by organized crime, "estimates of the annual intake have varied
from $7 to $50 billion.' 160 The magnitude of the figures indicates the
criminal law has grossly failed to control gambling. Loan sharking is
the second largest source of money for organized crime, and gambling
profits provide the necessary capital for loan-shark operations. 161 The
narcotics trade is probably the third most lucrative source, again
based on the large amounts of money available to organized crime.162
"Prostitution and bootlegging play a small and declining role in or-
ganized crime's operations," while the infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness is on the upswing.163
Illegal gambling is extremely difficult to detect and deter. It takes
place by consent so it is easily concealed. There is an absence of com-
plaining victims. Moreover, the transaction is quickly and privately
made. It is far simpler to place a bet than to buy heroin. The public
tends not to regard gambling as particularly wrongful. Who hasn't
made a friendly bet?- Law enforcement is sporadic, falling "with
158. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 8 (1968).
159. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 2 (1967). See also Kefauver Commission, S.
Rep. No. 141, 82nd Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1951), which states, "Gambling is the principle
source of income for organized criminal gangs in the country." See generally Johnson,
Organized Crime, Challenge to the American Legal System, Part 1, 53 J. CRIM. L.C.&
P.S. 399 (1962), and Part 11, 54 J. CRIM. L.C.&P.S. 1 (1963).
160. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 3 (1967).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3-4.
163. Id. at 4.
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grossly unequal force on the inhabitants of urban ghettos."'164 It fre-
quently involves the same questionable techniques used in detecting
drug violations. Bribery and corruption of local government officials
takes place more frequently than generally believed. 165 Widespread
disregard for the law results. There is no reason to believe that Wash-
ington is immune to organized crime.
The Judiciary Committee did not address itself to the problem of
gambling, and Washington's existing position on gambling is highly
irrational. On the one hand, a person can gamble away every penny
that he has or that he can beg, borrow or steal so long as he bets on
horses through the legalized "parimutuel method."'166 On the other
hand, almost every other form of gambling is prohibited. A person
commits a crime if he makes side bets on the horses in any way not
using the legalized parimutuel method1 67 or submits guesses to a news-
paper about which football teams may prevail so that he might
thereby win a prize. 168 If Washington is to avoid organized crime and
the fate of some eastern states, it must immediately develop an imagi-
native and careful scheme to legalize and control certain forms of
gambling. A state lottery should be instituted and, 169
in addition to the provision of state lotteries, off-track betting can be
controlled by the establishment of state-run betting shops as in Aus-
tralia. Insofar as gambling is harmful, the harm can at least be reduced
by fixing limits to wagers and other measures of control. As for other
forms of gambling, the Nevada solution whereby the state tax commis-
sion administers gambling by supervising a license system under which
all applicants have to be cleared by the commission-and state,
county, and city taxes and license fees represent a substantial revenue
-has operated with success for many years. The infiltration of organ-
ized criminals has been blocked by screening all applicants for crim-
inal records. The tax commission employs inspectors and has held
hearings and revoked several licenses. The principal lesson to be
learned from Nevada is that gambling can be kept clean and does not
have to be run by criminals.
There is no reason why organized crime should find fertile fields in
164. PACKER, supra note 15, at 349.
165. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 61-69 (1967).
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 67.16.060 (1959).
167. Id.
168. Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 80 Wn.2d 502, 495 P.2d 1366 (1972).
169. MORRIS & HAWKINS. THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL
11-12 (1968).
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Washington, and there is no reason why the income of Washing-
tonians should be used to line the pockets of organized criminals and
their crooked political allies. Our current ostrich-like approach to
gambling must be changed.
It would also be wise for the legislature to provide for an overall
"watchdog" commission with jurisdiction and full investigatory
powers over gambling, drugs, and prostitution. The purposes of the
commission should be to expose all abuses and to make recommenda-
tions for improving the legal controls over gambling, drugs, and pros-
titution. Its members should have overlapping terms (three years?)
and be appointed by the governor with at least three-fourths of the
commissioners coming from the ranks, of reporters currently working
in the mass media. However, there should not be more than one re-
porter coming from each firm, and no member should be allowed to
succeed himself or to serve more than twice.
VIII. STANDING CRIMINAL LAW REVISION
COMMISSION
Washington's existing criminal code has been the piecemeal
product of emotional actions and reactions, historical accidents and
political attitudes seeking a punishment for almost every legislative
measure. It is old, unorganized, sometimes accidental in its coverage,
and largely a combination of deliberate enactment and common law
that history explains, but does not justify. The Judiciary Committee's
Revised Washington Criminal Code is a healthy corrective step. It has
been sixty-three years coming. It does not cover the entire field of
criminal law. Moreover, much decriminalization remains to be done
besides other necessary tasks. A vast number of crimes are scattered
throughout the other chapters of R.C.W. They should be collected,
rationalized, evaluated, harmonized with the Proposed Code, re-
drafted where necessary, and put into one place: in the criminal code.
There are additional concerns. For example, the Judiciary Commit-
tee's Proposed Code does not address itself to compensation for vic-
tims of crimes 70-a question whose consideration is long overdue. It
170. My colleague, Professor P. Richard Cosway, Chairman, Special Committee on
Crime Victims Reparations Act, tells me that a third draft proposal has been prepared
for discussion by the Uniform Law Commissioners; see also, Symposium--Govern-
mental Compensation for Victims, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).
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fails to deal adequately with the question of voluntary euthanasia,' 71
and its treatment of capital punishment could not have taken into
account the recently decided cases of the Supreme Court of the United
States.17 2 The Judiciary Committee's sweeping provision on criminal
solicitation creates serious problems of overbreadth, 7 3 as does its
proposed statute on conspiracy. 174 The Supreme Court of the United
States has held Washington's obscenity statute defective in certain
171. For a proposed statute see Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REV.
239 (1970).
172. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972). (Discretionary imposition of
death penalty, which is so infrequently and randomly imposed that it loses its deterrent
value, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth and fourteenth
amendments.)
173. The act of criminal solicitation is defined in R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.020(l): "A
person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of a specific offense, he offers to give or gives money or other thing of value
to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such offense or which
would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or attempted commis-
sion." It should be remembered that solicitation involves conduct even more remote
from the commission of an offense than an attempt. The Committee's provision fails to
require as an element of the crime either an overt act committed in response to the so-
licitation or an actual ability to give "money or other thing of value to another .. "
The crime is completed by the mere utterance of certain words. A serious civil liberty
problem is presented by this provision with respect to its application in first amendment
contexts. The section does not distinguish between the conduct sought to be prohibited
and the advocacy or expression of approval of the crime allegedly solicited, e.g., prosti-
tution or gambling. Under the Committee's proposal, advocacy of action could be pun-
ished even though that advocacy was neither directed toward incitement nor productive
of imminent lawless action, nor likely to incite or produce such action, both of which
are constitutional prerequisites for impairing freedom of speech. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). As the Supreme Court said in another case, Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), "Where particular speech falls close to the line separating
the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken fact-finding---inherent in all liti-
gation-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.':
174. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030(l) defines criminal conspiracy:
A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy when, with intent that conduct consti-
tuting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or
cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits'an'overt act
in pursuance of such agreement:
(a) which act is an unequivocal step toward the performance of that crime; and
(b) which act corroborates the actor's intent that such crime be committed.
Conspiracy laws require conduct that occupies a position more remote from the
commission of an offense than an attempt and less remote than solicitation. This pro-
posed conspiracy law and its prosecutions could threaten and deter first amendment lib-
erties in at least three ways. First, it allows imposition of heavy criminal penalties for
conduct that goes little beyond thoughts and talking and having only the most peripheral
relation to criminal conduct. The act required need only be clear; it need not be a sub-
stantial step as required by the law of attempt. Second, it imposes criminal liability for
non-dangerous conduct on all joint activity, basing the imposition of speech and asso-
ciation; third, the procedures by which criminal cases are tried make it almost impos-
sible for an individual defendant to have his case considered independently by the jury
or to defend himself adequately. For discussion of much which applies to this proposed
statute, see Montgomerie, Conspiracy: Legitimate Instrument or An Unconstitutional
Weapon?, 3 COL. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 94 (1971).
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applications. 175 Corrective needs cannot wait sixty-three more years
for another code revision. Although the Proposed Code is good, the
complete reform and rationalization of Washington's criminal law has
not been attempted or accomplished by the Judiciary Committee. That
is a long-term project to which we should now turn. Furthermore,
Washington needs a relevant and statewide program for collecting
crime information. A fully effective system of criminal justice is im-
possible -without an adequate crime information system. However, in
this respect, Washington is "one of the most backward states in the
Union."'1 76 Thus, I recommend that the legislature establish a
Standing Criminal Law Revision Commission, charging it to collect
crime information, constantly to assess the adequacy and fitness of
criminal law sanctions for our social needs, and regularly to make
recommendations for legislation.
175. Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972). Given the recent decisions in Re-
drup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), Washington's legislature would be well
advised to repeal the existing statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.68.010 (1959). The Oregon
Legislature has taken this step following the Reidel case. Oregon's new statute shows an
innovative approach by controlling the commercialization and exploitation of sexual
materials. It carefully controls and limits the prosecution of obscene materials to two
cases: (1) when they are made available to minors, and (2) when they are publicly dis-
played and exploited for advertising purposes. ORE. LAWS ch. 743, §§ 255-261 (1971).
See also Reno, Obscenity Revisited- 1972, 58 A.B.AJ. 736 (1972). The second cate-
gory could present constitutional problems.
176. C. SCHMID & 7. SCHMID, CRIME IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 333 (1972). The
authors also state:
Washington occupies the unenviable position of being one of the most backward
states in the Union with respect to the availability of systematic and reliable crime
data. In fact, according to a recent survey, Washington is one of only two states
without a central records and identification system. Neither does Washington have
a centralized program for compiling crime statistics. Most states have such pro-
grams or are in the process of establishing them.
If a state establishes a statistical reporting system which reveals all aspects of the
crime situation and gives sufficient leadership to collecting and processing such
data, it will go a long way in carrying out its responsibilities to its citizens. Good
management, good government-in short, an effective system of criminal justice is
impossible without an adequate crime information program.
In addition to the administrative value of an efficient crime information system,
its importance in basic research cannot be overemphasized. There is a growing re-
alization that crime and other serious problems that constantly press for solution
cannot be dealt with effectively without a wider and deeper understanding of the
forces and conditions producing them, and that this understanding can be attained
only by thorough and scientific study.
Id. at 333-34. (footnotes omitted).
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CONCLUSION
The criminal law is a highly specialized social instrument. It is
useful for achieving some ends, but not others. It can be used success-
fully for protecting the lives and property of persons and for pre-
venting the exploitation and corruption of youth and others who are
in special need of care and protection. But when it is improperly
used, the criminal law can produce more harm than good. We pres-
ently suffer from a crisis of overcriminalization which results in the
costly misuse of law enforcement personnel at a time of rising crime
rates among the more serious crimes. Overcriminalization tends to
breed cynicism and indifference to criminal law processes, to allow
enforcement of the criminal law on a discriminatory basis, to enforce
one group's private morality onto other citizen groups. With Professor
Kadish, "one hopes that attempts to set out the facts and to particu-
larize the perils of overcriminalization may ultimately affect the deci-
sions of the legislatures" and that "it may be that the best hope for the
future lies in efforts to understand more subtly and comprehensively
than we do now the dynamics of the legislative (and, it must be added,
popular) drive to criminalize.' 177 The obvious point is that much de-
criminalization is needed. 178 This truth was fully recognized by the
President's Crime Commission when it reported that "only when the
load of law enforcement has been lightened by stripping away those
responsibilities for which it is not suited will we begin to make the
criminal law a more effective instrument of social protection."', 79 It is
in this spirit that I have proposed the above limitations on the use of
the criminal sanction in Washington, limitations which I believe are
not only unobjectionable, but necessary and desirable.
177. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 170 (1967).
178. "The first principle of our cure for crime is this: we must strip off the moral-
istic excresences on our criminal justice system so that it may concentrate on the essen-
tial. The prime function of the criminal law is to protect our persons and our property:
these purposes are now engulfed in a mass of other distracting, inefficiently performed.
legislative duties. When the criminal law invades the sphere of private morality ... it
exceeds its proper limits at the cost of neglecting its primary tasks. This unwarranted
extension is expensive, ineffective and criminogenic." Morris and Hawkings, The Over-
reach of the Criminal Law, 9 MIDWAY 71 (1969).
179. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT, THE COURTS 107 (1967).
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